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Over the past thirty years, bankruptcy sales have become a vitally important 
aspect of bankruptcy practice.1  This Article focuses on asset sales that occur 
																																																								
 + Research Professor of Law, St. John’s School of Law; Fellow, St. John’s Institute for 
Bankruptcy Studies.  J.D., NYU School of Law; B.A., Binghamton University.  I would like to 
thank John Hennigan, Keith Sharfman, Ray Warner and everyone else at St. John’s University 
School of Law for their thoughtful comments and generous support.  Significant assistance, 
comments, ideas, and support were also provided by Barry Adler, Kara Bruce, Diane Lourdes 
Dick, Brian Frye, the Honorable Allan L. Gropper, Matthew Hutchins, John Leubsdorf, Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, Troy McKenzie, Bill Nelson, Chrystin Ondersma, Rafael Pardo, and Mark 
Schneiderman.  This Article also benefitted from the research and editorial assistance of Jessica 
Macrina, Piergiorgio Maselli, Patrick McBurney, Jon Ruiss, Jr., and Andrew Zapata.  The 
mistakes that remain are my own.  Finally, this Article would not have been possible without the 
support of my wife, Morgan Hall.  © Matthew A. Bruckner (2012). 
 1. See Douglas G. Baird, Lessons From the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 271, 272 (2012) (noting that “[s]ales are the norm in large reorganizations” in Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proceedings); see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at 
Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 674 (2003) (citing data finding that the majority of large Chapter 
11 cases in 2002 resulted in sales); Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Sales or Plans: A 
Comparative Account of the “New” Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591, 597 (2011) 
(stating that Chapter 11 cases often result in Quick Sales).  But see Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph 
W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42–44 (2007) (stating that the number 
of bankruptcy sales decreased drastically between 2003 and 2006). 
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outside the context of a plan of reorganization and are conducted pursuant to  
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (Quick Sales).2  Section 363(b)(1) of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code (the Bankruptcy Code)3 provides the statutory 
foundation for Quick Sales, permitting the debtor-in-possession4 to use, sell, or 
lease all or part of the property of the bankruptcy estate outside of the ordinary 
course of business.5  Most Quick Sales are conducted pursuant to § 363(f), 
which allows a debtor-in-possession to sell assets of the estate “free and clear” 
of non-estate interests if the sale meets one of the conditions outlined under 
§ 363(f).6  Section 363(f) is a “powerful tool” that permits a  
debtor-in-possession to maximize the estate’s recovery from an asset without 
becoming unduly entangled in controversies concerning the existence, validity, 
and priority of third-party interests in the property to be sold.7  It also allows a 
																																																								
 2. Quick Sales can occur in rapid fashion.  See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 93, 96 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing how a debtor was required to exit bankruptcy in forty-two 
days), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 
In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 423 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (reasoning that the “need 
for speed” in selling may be evidenced by a variety of factors, including impending adverse 
market conditions); ELIZABETH J. AUSTIN ET AL., N.Y.C. BAR COMM. ON BANKR. & CORPORATE 
REORGANIZATION, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: TRENDS IN ASSET SALES AND LIQUIDATIONS  
§ 2 (2010), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071875Corporate 
BankruptciesTrendsinAssetSalesandLiquidations.pdf (noting that Quick Sales are often 
completed in less than sixty days). 
 3. This Article uses the terms “Bankruptcy Code” and “Code” to refer to the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978.  Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C.). 
 4. Although § 363 speaks only in terms of a trustee, the Bankruptcy Code confers the 
trustee’s powers to sell property of the estate to a debtor-in-possession. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) 
(2006); see also Philip A. Schovanec, Bankruptcy: The Sale of Property Under Section 363: The 
Validity of Sales Conducted Without Proper Notice, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 489, 490–91 (1993) 
(stating that a debtor-in-possession’s interest in the property to be sold is protected by § 363). 
 5. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006). 
 6. Section 363(f) provides: 
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and clear of 
any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if—(1) applicable 
nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest; (2) 
such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to 
be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4) such interest 
is in bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable 
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest. 
Id.; see also, e.g., In re Collins, 180 B.R. 447, 450 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (noting that, because  
§ 363(f) is written in the disjunctive, the trustee must only satisfy one of the enumerated 
conditions). 
 7. See, e.g., D’Antonio v. Bella Vista Assocs., LLC (In re Bella Vista Assocs., LLC), No. 
07-18134, 2007 WL 4555891, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2007) (“The goal of section 363(f)(4) 
is to allow[] the sale of property subject to dispute ‘so that liquidation of the estate’s assets need 
not be delayed while such disputes are being litigated.’” (alteration in original) (quoting In re 
Durango Georgia Paper Co., 336 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005)); In re NJ Affordable 
Homes Corp., No. 05-60442, 2006 WL 2128624, at *13 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 26, 2006) (holding 
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debtor-in-possession to expeditiously sell estate assets for the highest available 
price early in the process and to resolve most controversies at a later date.8  
The overriding concept is to allow the debtor-in-possession to convert 
distressed properties into liquid assets quickly and distribute them to the 
estate’s creditors through a confirmed plan.9  Today, the vast majority of large, 
Chapter 11 cases involve the sale of all or a part of those companies through 
the Quick Sale process.10  There are sharp divisions among bankruptcy 
scholars as to whether the increased use of Quick Sales heralds “The End of 
Bankruptcy,”11 but it is undisputed that such sales occur more frequently than 
ever before; as many as two-thirds of all large bankruptcy cases now involve a 
Quick Sale.12  However, instead of injecting itself into the debate about 
whether Quick Sales are desirable or appropriate, this Article takes as its 
starting point that such sales occur regularly and have become increasingly 
important.13  Instead, this Article focuses on, and seeks to improve, the 
procedure by which Quick Sales occur. 
An apparent tension exists, however, between § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code 
and Rule 7001(2) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP).  
Section 363(b) allows a debtor to sell property of the estate by filing a sale 
																																																																																																																																
that a trustee’s satisfaction of § 363(f) allowed for a Quick Sale); In re Gulf States Steel, Inc. of 
Ala., 285 B.R. 497, 507 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2002) (stating that § 363(f)(4) is intended to allow 
property sales amid a dispute); In re Oneida Lake Dev., Inc., 114 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
1990) (stating that § 363(f) authorizes a debtor to sell free of encumbrances). 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
 9. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 93, 96–97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d 576 
F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010); In re NJ Affordable 
Homes, 2006 WL 2128624, at *13 (stating that a Quick Sale was “the only plan capable of 
benefitting the largest number of injured parties”). 
 10. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 674 (stating that “in 84% of all large Chapter 
11s from 2002, the investors entered bankruptcy with a deal in hand or used it to sell the assets of 
the business”).  But see LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 42–44 (suggesting that 2002 
represented a high-water mark for bankruptcy sales and therefore Baird and Rasmussen’s focus 
on the period leading up to 2002 is misleading). 
 11. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 751, 751 (2002) (analyzing Chapter 11 as a tool for selling assets); see also Elizabeth B. 
Rose, Comment, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b): The Opportunity for Sweetheart Deals 
Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 252 (2006) (“[P]ermitting the 
use or sale of the debtor’s assets outside of a reorganization plan has been debated since  
1938 . . . .”). 
 12. See Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 1, at 597 (“[A]pproximately two-thirds of all large 
bankruptcy proceedings involv[e] a sale of the firm, as opposed to a more traditional 
reorganization plan.”); see also Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 675 (showing that fifty-six 
percent of Chapter 11 proceedings from a 2002 sample were sales); Stephen J. Lubben, The “New 
and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 840 (2004).  But see LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 
1, at 42–44. 
 13. See Lubben, supra note 12, at 840; see also Rose, supra note 11, at 250 (claiming that 
the current rules governing the approval of § 363 sales are “grossly insufficient”). 
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motion with the court.14  Motion practice is an expeditious procedural 
mechanism and, by allowing Quick Sales to proceed by motion, Congress 
evidenced its recognition that Quick Sales sometimes need to occur rapidly.15  
By contrast, FRBP 7001(2) requires a debtor-in-possession to initiate a  
trial-like procedure—known as an adversary proceeding—in order to 
“determine the validity, priority, or extent of [an] interest in property.”16  
Parties-in-interest have seized on this tension to assert that, if they claim some 
interest in the property to be sold, the debtor cannot sell that property until an 
adversary proceeding determines the extent of their interest.17  However, these 
objections are sometimes raised for purely strategic reasons by parties without 
an interest in seeing the debtor successfully reorganize and, for the reasons 
discussed below, these objections rarely require the court to substantially delay 
a Quick Sale.18  Unfortunately, courts differ when confronted on whether to 
require an ex ante adversary proceeding before approving a Quick Sale.19 
Strategic objections can cause substantial inefficiencies in a Quick Sale 
case.20  Strategic objections are a serious concern, particularly when the 
objecting party bears little of the downside risk if its objection destroys the 
debtor-in-possession’s ability to reorganize.  Not only is delay potentially 
expensive, it is also unjustified in many cases.  Consequently, the Bankruptcy 
																																																								
 14. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). 
 15. See discussion infra Part II. 
 16. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2); see, e.g., In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., No.  
08-11261, 2008 WL 2951974, at *6 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2008) (reasoning that a lien can only 
be invalidated through a Rule 7001(2) adversary proceeding); cf. In re Mansaray-Ruffin, 530 F.3d 
230, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that a lien’s validity must be resolved through a Rule 7001 
adversary proceeding); In re Beard, 112 B.R. 951, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) (declaring that the 
courts must resolve a challenge to a lien’s validity or existence in an adversary proceeding and 
not in the confirmation process). 
 17. See, e.g., Darby v. Zimmerman (In re Popp), 323 B.R. 260, 269–70 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2005); In re Whitehall Jewelers, 2008 WL 2951974, at *4 (holding that the debtors could not sell 
property before determining if it was property of the estate). 
 18. See discussion infra Part III. 
 19. Compare In re Robotic Vision Systems, Inc., 322 B.R. 502, 508 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005) 
(finding that no dispute existed because there was no adversary proceeding), and In re Olympia 
Holding Corp., 129 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (concluding that the property was 
subject to a bona fide dispute contemplated under § 363(f)(4) because an answer disputing 
ownership was filed in a separate adversary proceeding), with Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 
B.R. 163, 171–72 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (deciding that the court must first determine whether 
property to be sold is property of the estate before a trustee can sell the disputed property), and In 
re Whitehall Jewelers, 2008 WL 2951974, at *4 (“A bankruptcy court may not allow the sale of 
property as ‘property of the estate’ without first determining whether the property is property of 
the estate.”). 
 20. Cf. Ion Media Networks, Inc. v. Cyrus Select Opportunities Masterfund Ltd. (In re Ion 
Media Networks, Inc.), 419 B.R. 585, 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a subordination 
agreement limiting a party’s ability to object to a plan of reorganization should be enforced). 
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Code contemplates that courts need not resolve most objections to bankruptcy 
sales before the sale is approved.21 
This Article is concerned primarily with instances where an objecting party 
seeks to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis the debtor by raising the 
specter of delay, rather than vindicating a right or interest provided by the 
bankruptcy laws.  Strategic objections are troublesome because even a brief 
delay in consummating a Quick Sale may destroy a tremendous amount of 
value for the estate’s creditors as a whole or can force a company to liquidate22 
instead of allowing it to reorganize.23  At times, it may be difficult to 
distinguish between legitimate objections and strategic objections because the 
differences often relate to the objecting parties’ subjective intent.24  The ideal 
solution, therefore, does not require a bankruptcy judge to attempt to decipher 
the subjective intent of objecting parties.  Rather, the ideal solution can be 
applied in all circumstances and filters out strategic objections while giving 
due consideration to legitimate objections. 
The current situation is far from ideal and is due, in part, to § 363(f) being 
one of the most frequently misconstrued Bankruptcy Code provisions.25  
Although courts generally require debtors-in-possession to make, at minimum, 
																																																								
 21. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006); see also Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances Gecker, Due 
Process and Bankruptcy: A Contradiction in Terms?, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 90 (1993-1994) 
(noting that, in some instances, sales may need to occur before the court resolves objections). 
 22. See Baird, supra note 1, at 10 (finding that liquidation causes a realization of only ten 
percent of the company’s book value). 
 23. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1997), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 
(stating that parties traditionally view reorganizations as superior to liquidation because assets are 
more valuable when used in their corresponding industries than when sold for scrap); see also 
Rose, supra note 11, at 271 (arguing that the fundamental policy of preserving business value is 
implicit in Chapter 11 bankruptcy).  A Quick Sale may allow a debtor to capture most or all of the 
value that would occur in a reorganization because it permits the debtor to sell to a buyer who 
values the debtor’s assets as a going concern, rather than merely for their liquidation value.  See 
William T. Bodoh et al., The Parameters of the Non-Plan Liquidating Chapter Eleven: Refining 
the Lionel Standard, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 11 (1992) (proposing that a debtor have the option to 
choose a Quick Sale); see also George W. Kuney, Let’s Make it Official: Adding an Explicit 
Preplan Sale Process as an Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1269 
(2004) (proposing the adoption of a Quick Sale plan in the Bankruptcy Code); Rachael M. 
Jackson, Comment, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a Post-Enron World: Trusting 
the Bankruptcy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 451, 496 
(2005) (asserting the Code’s preservation of asset value must be made in good faith in order for 
Chapter 11 to apply).  But see LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 22–24 (citing an empirical 
study finding that the recoveries in bankruptcy sales from 2000 to 2004 of large public companies 
was approximately half that of reorganization cases). 
 24. For the purposes of this Article, “legitimate objections” are those objections in which a 
party is seeking to vindicate some right or interest protected by the Bankruptcy Code or the 
Bankruptcy Rules. 
 25. John Collen, What Do the Subsections of Section 363(f) Really Mean? A Primer on 
Selling Free and Clear of Interests, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 563, 563 (1997). 
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a prima facie case justifying a Quick Sale,26 a uniform standard for approving 
contested Quick Sales has not yet emerged.27  The lack of a clear standard has 
resulted in inconsistent judgments,28 which implicitly encourage parties to 
raise strategic objections that are designed to cause delay or otherwise muddle 
the Quick Sale process, rather than represent a party’s attempt to vindicate its 
rights.29 
This Article focuses on, and seeks to improve, the procedure by which 
Quick Sales occur.30  This Article suggests that the best solution would require 
bankruptcy courts to apply a preliminary injunction standard, specifically the 
Leubsdorf-Posner formulation,31 to evaluate the merits of Quick Sale 
objections.32  When ruling on a Quick Sale objection, a bankruptcy court 
should make two determinations: (1) the likelihood that each side will succeed 
																																																								
 26. See, e.g., Federico v. McGranahan (In re Federico), No. 08-2182, 2009 WL 2905855, at 
*3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009); In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., No. 08-11261, 2008 WL 
2951974, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2008); In re Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 322 B.R. 502, 508 
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2005). 
 27. Compare In re Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. 322 B.R. at 506 (concluding that “a bona fide 
dispute exists when there is an objective basis for either factual or legal dispute as to the validity 
of an interest in property” and that the dispute is raised at minimum in a pleading or in an 
argument), and In re Olympia Holding Corp., 129 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) 
(concluding that the property was subject to a bona fide dispute within the meaning of § 363(f)(4) 
because the trustee filed an answer disputing the objecting party’s claims of ownership in a 
separate adversary proceeding), with Anderson v. Conine (In re Robertson), 203 F.3d 855, 863 
(5th Cir. 2000), Darby v. Zimmerman (In re Popp), 323 B.R. 260, 266 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) 
(stating that before getting to § 363(f), a determination must be made to see if the property is 
property of the estate), Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 B.R. 163, 171–72 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that the court must first decide whether the property to be sold is property of the estate 
before the trustee could sell it), In re Whitehall Jewelers, 2008 WL 2951974, at *4 (“A 
bankruptcy court may not allow the sale of property as ‘property of the estate’ without first 
determining whether the property is property of the estate.”), and In re Coburn, 250 B.R. 401, 
403 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). 
 28. George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining 
the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 272–73 (2002) (characterizing the standards as 
vague and calling bankruptcy courts the “auction houses of choice” where financially unstable 
businesses go to barter their assets). 
 29. Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 258, 275 (2012). 
 30. Of course, if Quick Sales are not normatively desirable, obstructionism and delay could 
be perceived as efficiency maximizing.  To the extent that the growing importance of the Quick 
Sale mechanism is not normatively desirable, however, the appropriate solution is to amend the 
Bankruptcy Code.  As discussed further infra, strategic objections to Quick Sales can have 
distortionary effects and should not be encouraged. 
 31. See infra Part IV(b). 
 32. Although there is a “dizzying diversity of formulations” of the requirements for a 
preliminary injunction, Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for 
Preliminary Injunctions, 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 846 (1989), this Article argues that the appropriate 
standard in the Quick Sale context is the Leubsdorf-Posner formulation.  Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. 
v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 541–42 (1978). 
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on the merits and (2) the amount of irreparable harm that each side will suffer 
in the event the court acts on merits that later prove to be false.33 Following 
these determinations, the court should multiply the expected loss and the 
likelihood of success on the merits, and then adopt the course of action 
suggesting the smaller probable loss.34  This solution differs from many of the 
current approaches by placing the burden on the objecting party to demonstrate 
why a Quick Sale should be delayed (instead of requiring the debtor to show 
why it should be approved), thereby filtering out many strategic objections and 
ensuring that legitimate objections receive the degree of procedural protection 
that they are entitled to receive.  Moreover, adopting a preliminary injunction 
standard for evaluating the merits of Quick Sale objections should deter 
parties-in-interest from attempting to muddle the sale process.35 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Quick Sale process and 
explains why bankruptcy sales often must be concluded rapidly if they are to 
benefit the estate.  Part II provides a brief overview of the two primary 
procedural tracks on which most bankruptcy matters proceed.  Part II also 
explains why Quick Sales were designed to be resolved through the more 
expeditious procedural track, known as a “contested matter,” and why pushing 
Quick Sales onto the slower procedural track, known as an “adversary 
proceeding,” is generally unnecessary or inappropriate.  Part III analyzes 
several cases involving objections to Quick Sales and concludes that the 
current, muddled regime for analyzing Quick Sales increases the risk of 
strategic behavior.  Part IV then suggests a formulation of the preliminary 
injunction standard advocated by Judge Richard Posner and Professor 
Leubsdorf is the appropriate standard to use when evaluating objections to 
Quick Sales because it is capable of filtering out or preventing strategic 
objections without harming parties with legitimate objections. 
I.  HOW BANKRUPTCY SALES WORK	
Sections 1123(b)(4) and 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provide 
independent bases for a trustee36 to sell property of the bankruptcy  
																																																								
 33. See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 594; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 
541–42.  This iteration of the preliminary injunction standard differs from the traditional 
formulation; however, its focus on error-minimization makes it ideal for the Quick Sale context.  
See infra Part IV (providing further discussion). 
 34. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 542. 
 35. Id. at 565. 
 36. For the purposes of this Article, the term “trustee” refers to either a case trustee 
appointed by the court or a debtor-in-possession acting as a fiduciary for the estate’s creditors 
who has all the rights and duties of a court-appointed trustee.  The Bankruptcy Code generally 
allows the debtor in a Chapter 11 case to remain in possession and control of the estate’s assets, 
and imposes a fiduciary duty on the debtor-in-possession to act at the behest of the estate’s 
creditors.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006); see also Schovanec, supra note 4, at 491 (outlining the 
powers entrusted to a trustee). 
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estate37 outside of the ordinary course of business.38  Passage of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the 1978 Act) liberalized the process by 
which a debtor-in-possession may use, sell, or lease property of the estate 
outside the ordinary course of business.39  The 1978 Act granted bankruptcy 
courts enormous discretion to approve Quick Sales, even where a debtor seeks 
to sell all or substantially all of its assets or to sell itself as a going concern.40  
Despite this apparent discretion, bankruptcy courts have voluntarily cabined 
their authority to approve Quick Sales by requiring, among other things, that: 
(1) a sound business reason exist for the sale;41 (2) adequate and reasonable 
																																																								
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (providing that the “estate is comprised of all the following 
property: . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of 
the case”); see also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) (holding that state law 
determines what constitutes “property” and “interests in property”); Butner v. United States, 440 
U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (“Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets 
of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.”); Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs., 
Inc. (In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.), 961 F.2d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A]lthough 
federal bankruptcy law determines the outer boundary of what may constitute property of the 
estate, state law determines the ‘nature of a debtor’s interest’ in a given item.” (citations 
omitted)).  Some courts have described § 541(a) as “expansive” in scope and that “every 
conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative, and derivative, 
is within the reach of § 541.”  In re Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing In re 
Anderson, 128 B.R. 850, 853 (D.R.I. 1991)).  Moreover, one of the basic objectives of Chapter 11 
is the maximization of property available to satisfy creditors, thereby suggesting that “property of 
the estate” should be construed broadly.  See Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 
554 U.S. 33, 57 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 38. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006) (stating that the use, sale, or lease of property of the 
estate that occurs in the ordinary course of business does not require judicial authorization); see 
also Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. at 37 n.2 (2008); Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 1, at 
596; Robert M. Fishman & Gordon E. Gouveia, What’s Driving Section 363 Sales After Chrysler 
and General Motors?, 19 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4 Art. 2, 1–2 (2010) (discussing the frameworks 
for selling outside the ordinary course of business). 
 39. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; see also Todd L. 
Friedman, The Unjustified Business Justification Rule: A Reexamination of the Lionel Canon in 
Light of the Bankruptcies of Lehman, Chrysler, and General Motors, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 
181, 185, 191–92 (2010) (arguing that sales may be approved if: (1) a sound business reason 
exists; (2) there is adequate notice to interested parties; (3) the price is fair and reasonable; and (4) 
the sale is conducted in good faith). 
 40. See Rose, supra note 11, at 249–50, 252–53 (concluding that a plain reading of the 
statute permits a sale of all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets outside of a plan of 
reorganization and without complying with Chapter 11’s “numerous and intricate requirements 
for plan confirmation”); see also Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 4–5 (noting that the Second 
Circuit argued against the imposition of rigid rules for bankruptcy sales outside the ordinary 
course of business so long as there is an articulable business justification). 
 41. For example, the Second Circuit has stated that good business factors include: 
proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole, the amount of elapsed time 
since the filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will be proposed and 
confirmed in the near future, the effect of the proposed disposition on future plans of 
reorganization, the proceeds to be obtained from the disposition vis-a-vis any appraisals 
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notice be given, including full disclosure of the sale terms and any insider 
relationships;42 (3) the sale price is fair and reasonable;43 and (4) the proposed 
buyer proceed in good faith.44  These requirements mirror the requirements to 
confirm a plan of reorganization.45 
Even so, Quick Sales are the preferred method of selling estate assets.46  At 
times, debtors need to sell property of the estate very quickly to preserve the 
going-concern value of a business or deteriorating asset.  In such cases, time is 
of the essence.  This helps explain the preference for Quick Sales, which are 
“undeniably faster and less costly” than sales pursuant to a plan of 
reorganization.47 
																																																																																																																																
of the property, which of the alternatives of use, sale or lease the proposal envisions 
and, . . . whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value. 
Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
 42. See, e.g., In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) 
(holding that notice should inform all parties-in-interest of the sale’s impact). 
 43. See, e.g., Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 291 B.R. 39, 43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (requiring the bankruptcy court to analyze whether the sale price was fair and 
reasonable); In re Channel One Commc’ns, Inc., 117 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990); In 
re George Wash. Chevrolet, Inc., 118 B.R. 99, 102 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990); In re Indus. Valley 
Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Supplies, Inc., 77 B.R. 15, 21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 44. See, e.g., In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1986); In re 
Indus. Valley Refrigeration, 77 B.R. at 20–21; Friedman, supra note 39, at 191–92 (outlining the 
four-fold standard including a good faith purchase). 
 45. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2006) (requiring a disclosure statement containing adequate 
information to be submitted after notice and a hearing).  A plan of reorganization must also be 
proposed in good faith.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2006); see also Rose, supra note 11, at 263 
(“[C]ourts have resisted an unbridled use of nonreorganization sales” through the “emergency 
doctrine, the sub rosa doctrine, and the business justification test.”). 
 46. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 592 
F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2010); Bay Harbour Mgt. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC, No. 09-11078, 
2009 WL 2820610, at *1–2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009); In re Boogaart of Fla., Inc., 17 
B.R. 480, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (“Where . . . the value of the assets is rapidly decreasing 
 . . . liquidation of assets prior to the proposal and confirmation of plans of reorganization may be 
desirable because it will ultimately increase the amounts distributed to creditors after [liquidating] 
plans are confirmed.”); see also Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 9 (noting that, when asset values 
are declining rapidly, a delay for a plan of reorganization would be substantially harmful). 
 47. See Rose, supra note 11, at 26 (“[Section] 363 sales offer a drastically accelerated 
approval process when compared to [C]hapter 11 plan confirmation and attract debtors seeking to 
complete quicker and less expensive transactions.”); see also James Patrick Shea et al., Pushing 
the Limits of § 363—Is Confirmation Obsolete in the Asset Sale Case?, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
2 Art. 2, app. A (2005) (stating that sales are “[u]ndeniably faster and less costly” than sales 
pursuant to a plan of reorganization, which is a notably “[s]lower, more cumbersome process”).  
Other justifications for Quick Sales also exist.  See In re Rausch Mfg. Co., 59 B.R. 501, 503 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (approving sale because the buyer intended to maintain the debtor as a 
business entity that employed people in the community); see also In re Brethren Care of South 
Bend, Inc., 98 B.R. 927, 935 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that keeping a nursing home 
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This point cannot be over-emphasized.  A sale of assets may need to be 
consummated quickly because, among other possible reasons, the assets to be 
sold are deteriorating rapidly in value,48 the only willing and available 
purchaser is unwilling to delay the sale,49 because debtor-in-possession 
financing is about to run out and no further financing is available,50 or, for 
reasons specific to the individual case, there is insufficient time to allow for 
conversion to and liquidation under Chapter 7.51  If the trustee cannot complete 
the sale quickly, it may not occur at all or it may yield a significantly lower 
return to the estate, harming creditors in the process.52  In some cases, the sale 
of assets is the only available source of cash to fund the debtor’s ongoing 
operations, and the failure to consummate the sale may deprive the estate of 
necessary working capital.53 
If present, any of these concerns can threaten a debtor’s ability to reorganize 
and leave the debtor-in-possession with no option but to liquidate estate assets 
at fire-sale prices.54  In addition, Quick Sales allow the estate to sell assets at a 
price that, at least theoretically, takes into consideration the going-concern 
value of those assets.55  The value of distressed companies often diminishes 
																																																																																																																																
operating for its residents constituted a good business reason for approving a Quick Sale); Coastal 
Indus., Inc. v. IRS (In re Coastal Indus., Inc.), 63 B.R. 361, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (noting 
that hundreds of people would lose their jobs without the Quick Sale). 
 48. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 1, at 
597.   
 49. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 
(2d Cir. 2009); vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Thomson McKinnon Sec., 
Inc., 120 B.R. 301, 308–09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (determining that it was appropriate to 
approve the sale’s terms rather than risk loss of the debtor’s last remaining asset). 
 50. See, e.g., Order (A) Approving Bid Procedures Relating to Sale of Substantially All of 
the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Scheduling a Hearing to Consider the Sale and Approving the Form and 
Matter of Notices; (C) Establishing Procedures Relating to Assumption and Assignment of 
Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, Including Notice of Proposed Cure Amounts; 
and (D) Granting Relating Relief, In re Eclipse Aviation Corp., No. 08-13031 (MFW) (Bankr. D. 
Del. Dec. 23, 2008); In re Brookfield Clothes, Inc., 31 B.R. 978, 986 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 51. See Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 7 (“[C]onversion to [C]hapter 7 may be more 
expensive than a section 363 sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets.”); see also In re Alves 
Photo Service, Inc., 6 B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (finding that purported savings 
would not offset additional costs of a Quick Sale and liquidation was an unacceptable route). 
 52. In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988); see also Bodoh 
et al., supra note 23, at 7 (asserting that the decrease in value of the debtor’s assets would 
constitute a justifiable business concern for a Quick Sale). 
 53. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 100 B.R. 670, 675–76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(allowing a Quick Sale so that capital could be raised to meet financial obligations to creditors). 
 54. See Baird, supra note 1, at 10 (“The rule of thumb when you liquidate a company is that 
you realize ten percent of book value.”). 
 55. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527–28 (1984) (considering all parties 
involved when determining how best to preserve the going-concern of a debtor’s assets); see also 
D’Antonio v. Bella Vista Assocs., LLC (In re Bella Vista Assocs., LLC), No. 07-18134, 2007 
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quickly as key employees leave, customers cease ordering, and accounts 
receivable become more difficult to collect.56  In order to maximize the  
going-concern value of the assets (or company) to be sold, it is often necessary 
to complete a sale quickly.57  Bankruptcy judges are attuned to a  
debtor-in-possession’s need to act quickly and often approve Quick Sales in as 
little as sixty to ninety days.58 
Recognizing the need for speed, Congress enacted § 363(f) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to expeditiously sell 
estate assets for the highest available price, and resolve controversies 
concerning the existence, validity, and priority of liens and other interests in 
the property to be sold at a later date.59  Section 363(f) helps generate the 
highest possible price because it allows the debtor-in-possession to sell 
property of the estate free and clear of any interests in such property.60  A free 
and clear sale is important to buyers who want to obtain clean title to the assets 
being sold—title that is unencumbered by potential liens or other claims of 
interest.61  In turn, the ability to deliver an unencumbered title to property can 
allow the bankruptcy estate to generate a higher sale price, which maximizes 
the return to the estate’s creditors.62  These points help explain the preference 
																																																																																																																																
WL 4555891 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2007); Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 11 (noting that, in 
some cases, delay of the sale of debtor’s assets could cause a collapse of its business); Kuney, 
supra note 23, at 1282–83 (noting that the least expensive and time-consuming method of 
resolving bankruptcies is preferable). 
 56. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (characterizing such companies as 
“melting ice cube[s]” and noting the company’s going-concern value was reduced each day it did 
not sell), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 57. See, e.g., In re Oneida Lake Dev., Inc., 114 B.R. 352 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(approving a § 363(b) sale where the court was persuaded that doing so would maximize the 
value to the estate). 
 58. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (noting that orderly Quick Sales are often 
completed in less than sixty days); see also In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 420 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that the typical sale under § 363 is completed in less than ninety days). 
 59. See, e.g., In re Oneida Lake, 114 B.R. at 354–56.  The goal of § 363(f)(4) is to allow 
“the sale of property subject to dispute ‘so that liquidation of the estate’s assets need not be 
delayed while such disputes are being litigated.’” In re Bella Vista, 2007 WL 4555891, at *4 
(citing In re Durango Georgia Paper Co., 336 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005)); see also In 
re Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Ala., 285 B.R. 497, 507 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2002). 
 60. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006). Moreover, the debtor-in-possession “often has the 
specialized knowledge and industry contacts, through experience or previous efforts to solicit a 
buyer, necessary to sell the business in a manner that realizes an amount closer to the market 
value.” Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 12. 
 61. See Collen, supra note 25, at 564; see also Rose, supra note 11, at 259–60 (discussing 
the benefits for both debtors and asset purchasers of § 363(m) in providing finality to a § 363(b) 
sale). 
 62. See e.g., In re Oneida Lake, 114 B.R. at 356–58; see also Collen, supra note 25, at 564 
(observing that avoiding liens can help the debtor realize the best sale price). 
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for Quick Sales, which are “undeniably faster and less costly” than sales 
pursuant to a plan of reorganization.63 
Section 363(f) is a key statutory base for approving Quick Sales.  Section 
363(f)(4) provides that a debtor-in-possession may sell property of the estate 
“free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the 
estate, only if . . . such interest is in bona fide dispute.”64  This language 
furthers one of the goals of § 363(f), which is to allow “the sale of property 
subject to dispute ‘so that liquidation of the estate’s assets need not be delayed 
while such disputes are being litigated.’”65  Thus, this provision allows the 
expeditious sale of assets even when ownership is disputed. 
In order to qualify for the protection afforded by § 363(f)(4), courts should 
require only that the debtor-in-possession demonstrate that “there is an 
objective basis for either a factual or legal dispute as to the validity of the 
asserted interest.”66  This is a low threshold and should not require a court to 
resolve the underlying dispute or determine the probable outcome; instead, it 
must only determine that a dispute exists.67  Importantly, a “free and clear” 
Quick Sale allows a debtor-in-possession to return an asset quickly to 
productive use while ensuring a party’s interests that property is adequately 
																																																								
 63. Shea et al., supra note 47, at app. A. 
 64. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(4). 
 65. D’Antonio v. Bella Vista Assocs., LLC (In re Bella Vista Assocs., LLC), No. 07-18134, 
2007 WL 4555891, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2007) (citing In re Durango Georgia Paper Co., 
336 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005)); see also In re Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Ala., 285 B.R. 
497, 507 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2002). 
 66. In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 162 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); see also In re Gaylord Grain 
L.L.C., 306 B.R. 624 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2004) (defining “bona fide dispute” in similar terms); In re 
Bella Vista, 2007 WL 4555891, at *4; In re Downour, No. 06-30854, 2007 WL 963258, at *1 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2007); In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442, 2006 WL 
2128624, at *10 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 29, 2006) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code does not define 
“bona fide dispute”); In re Gulf States Steel, 285 B.R. at 507 (holding that the trustee has the 
burden to prove the existence of a bona fide dispute); Kuney, supra note 28, at 247 n.44 (noting 
that most courts consider whether a “bona fide dispute” exists under the objective test and “that 
the ‘subjective’ test of In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 49 B.R. 823 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) has been 
largely discarded.”). 
 67. In re Downour, 2007 WL 963258, at *1.  Courts generally have not required a party to 
commence an action, but merely require that a debtor-in-possession make a prima facie showing 
that a dispute exists and that such dispute could be meritorious. See In re Gaylord Grain, 306 
B.R. at 628; see also In re DVI, Inc., 306 B.R. 496, 503–04 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (holding that 
even if the debtor arguably held the creditor’s property in constructive trust, the existence of a 
bona fide dispute permits the property to be sold under § 363(f)(4)); In re Oneida Lake 114 B.R. 
at 358 (holding that § 363(f)(4) is satisfied “even though the Debtor has not as yet commenced 
the adversary proceeding” to avoid the creditor’s lien); Collen, supra note 25, at 574–75 (“[O]nce 
a party states that it disputes a lien, it follows tautologically that the lien is ‘in dispute.’”). 
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protected.68  By quickly returning assets to productive use, Quick Sales provide 
both a social and a private benefit.69 
Unfortunately, courts have often misconstrued § 363(f).70  For example, 
courts have disagreed as to whether a dispute as to ownership can qualify as a 
bona fide dispute within the meaning of § 363(f)(4) and whether the dispute 
must relate to the “validity or existence of an interest” or only to the amount of 
the lien or other claimed interest.71  As a result, courts sometimes allow such 
disputes to delay Quick Sales.72  The reason that courts misconstrue § 363(f) so 
frequently is not because confusion exists about whether an ownership dispute 
can qualify as a bona fide dispute within the meaning of § 363(f)(4), but 
whether the courts can resolve ownership disputes within the contested-matter 
framework at all.73 
The ability to rapidly conclude an asset sale enables a debtor-in-possession 
with limited resources to sell its business as a going concern and thereby 
preserve value.74  Quick Sales are often more advantageous vehicles for 
debtors-in-possession seeking to sell estate assets than sales consummated 
pursuant to a plan of reorganization.75  One chief advantage is that, after 
providing the requisite notice and opportunity for a hearing, these out-of-plan 
sales require only court approval to proceed, rather than going through the 
more time-consuming plan confirmation process.76  Because plan confirmation 
is not required for a Quick Sale, a court can often complete Quick Sales in less 
than sixty days.77 
																																																								
 68. See Kuney, supra note 28, at 248. 
 69. Id.  “Free and clear” sales are “an expeditious method to clear title to a disputed asset” 
that provide a social benefit through economic efficiency without material harm to property 
owners because sale orders generally provide for replacement liens on the proceeds of the sale.  
Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 B.R. 163, 171–72 (9th Cir. 2001); Darby v. 
Zimmerman (In re Popp), 323 B.R. 260, 266 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
 71. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 72. See infra Part III. 
 73. See In re Beard, 112 B.R. 951, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that claim 
allowance and lien valuation do not place in issue the basis of the lien itself, unlike a dispute as to 
the “validity, priority, or extent of a lien” where the former may be resolved by motion and the 
latter can only be resolved in an adversary proceeding.); see also Collen, supra note 25, at 563. 
 74. See In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 420 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that 
§ 363 sales are commonly completed in less than ninety days); see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 2 (stating that sales are often completed within sixty days of the petitioning date). 
 75. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 461–62 (noting that the plan confirmation process may 
span several years); see also Rose, supra note 11, at 250 (arguing that Quick Sales are “attractive 
to debtors because of their ease, speed[,] and finality”); Jessica Uziel, Comment, Section 363(b) 
Restructuring Meets the Sound Business Purpose Test with Bite: An Opportunity to Rebalance the 
Competing Interest of Bankruptcy Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2011). 
 77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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II.  QUICK SALES AND BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE	
Bankruptcy litigation generally occurs along one of two procedural tracks: 
one quick and one slow.78  The vast majority of bankruptcy litigation, 
including contested Quick Sales, occurs within the expeditious  
contested-matter procedural framework.79  In contrast to adversary 
proceedings, which are similar to civil actions in federal district court and 
require the filing of a complaint, answer, counterclaim, crossclaim, and  
third-party practice,80 the contested-matter procedural framework dispenses 
with such requirements in favor of a simple motion procedure.81  Under the 
contested-matter procedural framework, notice of a Quick Sale need only be 
given twenty-one days before a hearing and, if no objection is received, the 
court may enter an order approving the sale without a hearing.82  In appropriate 
cases, the bankruptcy court may shorten this already brief notice period even 
further.83 
																																																								
 78. Christopher M. Klein, Bankruptcy Rules Made Easy (2001): A Guide to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that Apply in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35, 38–39 (2001) 
(outlining both adversary proceedings and contested matters generally). 
 79. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 advisory committee’s 
note (“Whenever there is an actual dispute, other than an adversary proceeding, before the 
bankruptcy court, the litigation to resolve that dispute is a contested matter.”); Klein, supra note 
78, at 39 (arguing that contested matters are, “by a wide margin, the most common form of 
bankruptcy litigation”); Robert W. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in 
Bankruptcy Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1272 (1994) (“The bankruptcy rules require 
that a debtor move for a ‘free and clear’ sale as a contested matter.”). 
 80. SLW Capital, LLC v. Janica Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 
234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“An adversary proceeding is essentially a self-contained trial—still within the 
original bankruptcy case—in which a panoply of additional procedures apply.”).  An adversary 
proceeding employs essentially the same rules of procedure as a federal civil action, but it is tried 
in the federal bankruptcy court instead.  Klein, supra note 78, at 38.  Like a federal civil case, the 
filing of a complaint and serving of a summons, which defendants must answer, initiates 
adversary proceedings.  In re Beard, 112 B.R. 951, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990).  After the 
defendant responds, pretrial procedure begins, followed by discovery and formal trial.  An 
adversary proceeding concludes with judgment or with dismissal.  See, e.g., id.; see also Klein, 
supra note 78, at 38–39. 
 81. See Klein, supra note 78, at 44 n.53 (noting that an answer is required in adversary 
proceedings but not in contested matters); see also Johnson v. TRE Holdings LLC (In re 
Johnson), 346 B.R. 190, 195 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (discussing whether filing of an in rem order 
acts as a stay of proceedings). 
 82. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a), (f); see also Judith Greenstone Miller & Marc M. Bakst, 
Sales of Real Estate and Other Property of Bankruptcy Estates Under the Revised Local 
Bankruptcy Rules of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 26 MICH. 
REAL PROP. REV. 19, 20 (1999). 
 83. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(d) (permitting the court to enter an order of sale of property 
under $2,500 if no objection is filed within fifteen days of notice). 
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The contested-matter framework offers a more streamlined process 
compared to the adversary proceeding framework.84  For example, Professors 
Douglas Baird and Edward Morrison found that the average length of an 
adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois—from time of filing until resolution—has varied from about ten 
months in 1993 to about seven-and-a-half months in 2002.85  In contrast, courts 
almost always resolve contested matters more expeditiously and at a lower 
cost.86  The differences are stark.  As such, bankruptcy courts should carefully 
scrutinize attempts by creditors to force any matter out of the contested-matter 
framework and into the adversary proceeding framework. 
A company’s size or the nature of the assets being sold does not determine 
the choice of whether to proceed along the fast or slow tracks.  Even very large 
companies can be sold in “blindingly fast” fashion.87  The debtor may even sell 
its entire business as a going concern.88  One example, In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc., is one of the largest bankruptcy cases ever filed.  In that case, 
the debtors filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, listing assets in excess of 
$630 billion.89  Within one week, Barclays purchased substantially all of the 
debtors’ assets and most of its liabilities.90  The Lehman estate and Barclays 
subsequently litigated a number of issues, but the sale was not delayed while 
the numerous points of contention were concluded in a separate adversary 
proceeding. 
																																																								
 84. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A 
Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951, 951–52 (2005); see also Ericka F. Johnson, Due Process and 
363 Sales of Consignment Goods, ABI COMMITTEE NEWS (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/Young/vol6num4/due.html (noting that 
adversary proceedings, because of their foundation in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, cause 
many cases to take months to resolve). 
 85. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 84, at 966. 
 86. See Lubben, supra note 12, at 840 (“Today’s [C]hapter 11 is a swift, market-driven 
process that quickly moves troubled companies into more capable hands.”); see also Shea, supra 
note 47, at app. A. 
 87. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
727, 728 (2010) (noting that Chrysler recently completed its trip through Chapter 11 in 
“blindingly fast” fashion); see also Rose, supra note 11, at 269. 
 88. See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 58 (2008) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 
430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 89. See Bay Harbour Mgt., L.C. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also David Teather et al., Barlcays to Buy 
Lehman Brothers Assets, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 16 2008), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/16/barclay.lehmanbrothers1 (“Lehman listed assets 
of $639bn, making it the biggest bankruptcy filing ever, 10 times the size of the energy firm 
Enron when it went bust in late 2001.”). 
 90. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 415 B.R. at 82. 
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Section 363(b) allows a debtor to sell property of the estate by filing a sale 
motion with the court.91  FRBP 7001(2) requires that a debtor-in-possession 
commence an adversary proceeding to “determine the validity, priority, or 
extent of [an] interest in property.”92  Parties-in-interest have seized on the 
apparent tensions between the Code and the FRBP to assert that the property 
cannot be sold until the debtor’s interest in it is determined in an adversary 
proceeding.93  Some courts have found such arguments persuasive.94  These 
courts have refused to approve Quick Sales until the debtor has proven that the 
property to be sold is “property of the estate.”95 
Courts that have halted the Quick Sale process to require adversary 
proceedings have typically done so because they believe FRBP 7001(2) 
requires that an adversary proceeding be commenced to “determine the 
validity, priority, or extent of [an] interest in property.”96  Such courts are 
correct that FRBP 7001(2) requires an adversary proceeding, but they are 
incorrect as to when the determination of the extent of the debtor’s interest 
must occur.97  The determination may, but need not, precede the 
consummation of a Quick Sale, particularly when the failure to sell estate 
assets quickly may have significant deleterious effects on the estate and its 
creditors.98  Such courts appear to take an unduly narrow view of when 
ownership interests may be resolved.99 
Rather than requiring a pre-sale adversary proceeding to resolve such 
objections, courts should consider, as some already do, the question of what 
constitutes “property of the estate” as a “threshold question,” which may be 
addressed within the contested-matter procedural framework.100  This 
																																																								
 91. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). 
 92. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 93. See, e.g., Federico v. McGranahan (In re Federico), No. 08-2182, 2009 WL 2905855, at 
*2–3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009) (dismissing plaintiffs’ argument that sale orders issued without an 
adversary proceeding were void); In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., No. 08-11261, 2008 
WL 2951974, at *6–7 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2008). 
 94. See In re DVI, Inc., 306 B.R. 496, 501–02 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (explaining the 
majority and minority views of courts on this issue). 
 95. Id. at 504. 
 96. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 97. See, e.g., In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442, 2006 WL 2128624, at *10 
(Bankr. D.N.J. June 26, 2006) (finding that the court need only determine if a dispute exists). 
 98. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 21, at 90 (recognizing congressional support for ex 
post hearings in limited emergency circumstances). 
 99. This is particularly true because many asserted rights can be appropriately addressed 
post-sale. 
 100. See In re Balco Equities Ltd., 323 B.R. 85, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (allowing the 
sale but requiring the proceeds to be held in escrow until the objecting party’s property interest 
was determined in an adversary proceeding); see also In re Petition of KPMG, Inc., 284 B.R. 765, 
769 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Expeditiousness for the benefit of the estate in such instances 
sometimes requires a ‘contested matter’ approach to the threshold question of whether the 
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interpretation is supported by a review of the Bankruptcy Rules, which were 
amended to clarify that “an adversary proceeding is not required to effect [a] 
sale.”101  Bankruptcy Rules 6004(c) and 9014 clarify “whatever confusion 
existed under former Rule 701, which categorized a sale of property free and 
clear as an adversary proceeding, and successor Rule 7001, which did not 
specify such a sale as an adversary proceeding.”102  Furthermore, the 
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act bolsters this interpretation.103 
Additionally, a prior determination of the “validity, priority, or extent” of the 
estate’s interest in property is unnecessary in the Quick Sale context because  
§ 363(e) requires interested parties in a Quick Sale be provided “adequate 
protection.”104  By providing an objecting party with adequate protection, the 
debtor protects that party in the event that the court later determines that the 
objecting party had some interest in the property that was sold.  Even though a 
Quick Sale does not fully and finally determine the “validity, priority, or extent 
of [that] interest in property,” providing adequate protection ensures that the 
objecting party will be minimally affected by a Quick Sale.105  Therefore, a 
pre-sale adversary proceeding is not required when an objecting party has 
received adequate protection.106  In addition, § 363(b) itself further undermines 
the supposed need for a pre-sale proceeding by allowing the debtor to sell 
“property of the estate” by motion.107  This right would be sharply limited if 
																																																																																																																																
asserted adverse interest rises to the level entitled to Rule 7001 ‘Adversary Proceeding’ 
protections to accord Due Process.”).  But see Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 B.R. 163,  
171–72 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the court must decide the “threshold question” of whether 
the property to be sold is property of the estate before the trustee can sell the disputed property 
free and clear of liens and interests); see also Darby v. Zimmerman (In re Popp), 323 B.R. 260, 
266 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (remanding the case to bankruptcy court to determine “property of the 
estate,” which the Ninth Circuit said should have been decided before the proceeding). 
 101. See Nathan M. Eisler, Section 363—Use, Sale or Lease of Property, 1988 ANN. SURV. 
OF BANKR. LAW 349, 359 (1988); see also Robin E. Phelan & Susan L.S. Ernst, Solomon’s 
Capitulation: Current Developments Regarding the Automatic Stay, Adequate Protection and the 
Use of Collateral, 426 PLI/Comm 157, 300 (1987). 
 102. See Eisler, supra note 101, at 359. 
 103. 124 Cong. Rec. 32392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards) (remarking that, in 
limited emergency situations, an action will be required before a hearing is appropriate, but that a 
full hearing will be available after the fact); 125 Cong. Rec. 33993 (1978) (statement of Sen. 
Dennis DeConcini) (citing Representative Edwards’ remarks on pretrial actions). 
 104.  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an entity 
that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or 
leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition 
such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest. 
11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006). 
 105. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2). 
 106. Id. 
 107. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). 
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the courts required a debtor-in-possession to initiate an adversary proceeding 
to resolve every objection to the sale. 
III.  OBJECTIONS TO QUICK SALES	
Bankruptcy laws attempt to balance the numerous competing interests and 
policy objectives that exist in large corporate bankruptcy cases.108  A common 
result is that certain sections of the Bankruptcy Code and the FRBP consider 
how to harmonize competing demands within the context of a particular case.  
Bankruptcy courts repeatedly confront the tension between promoting 
expeditious resolution of cases and providing sufficient procedural protections 
to parties.  For example, § 363 and case law interpreting that section 
demonstrate that bankruptcy courts are concerned with maximizing the value 
of the bankruptcy estate by quickly converting distressed estate assets into a 
readily distributable fund for creditors; however, they are also tasked with 
ensuring that all affected parties-in-interest receive adequate procedural 
protection for their legitimate interests in the Quick Sale.109  The twin goals of 
§ 363 often appear to suggest different courses of action. 
Sales concluded pursuant to a plan of reorganization are often too slow to 
respond to the business realities of many situations because of the lengthy 
delays inherent in the process of plan confirmation itself.110  The length of the 
process does not generally relate to the sale of assets.  The plan confirmation 
process is long because of the procedural requirements, such as soliciting votes 
on a plan of reorganization111 and plan confirmation hearings.112 
Section 363 sales require none of these delays.  The ability to rapidly 
conclude a sale is one of the reasons Quick Sales have become so popular in 
recent years.113  Debtors frequently suggest that it is imperative for the 
																																																								
 108. See Lawless, supra note 79, at 1216 (noting the unique power of bankruptcy courts to 
bind disparate interests). 
 109. The bankruptcy laws are not necessarily equivalent to constitutional requirements.  
Sometimes they provide more than is required and, at other times, they fail to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.  Compare United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 
1378 (2010) (concluding that actual notice, even absent service of a summons and a complaint, 
satisfied due process), with Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011) (finding that the 
bankruptcy court exceeded its constitutional authority when it issued a final judgment on a “non-
core” proceeding). 
 110. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 461–62 (noting that the plan confirmation process may 
span several years); see also Uziel, supra note 76, at 1191 (suggesting that Quick Sales are 
streamlined because they avoid confirmation by various creditors). 
 111. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (2006). 
 113. See Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 1, at 596–97; see also Eisenberg & Gecker, supra 
note 21, at 86–88 (recognizing that non-plan sale hearings generally require “fast attention, but a 
hearing in a few days to a week will [normally] suffice”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Competing 
Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in Control vs. No Time to Spare, 2009 MICH. ST. L. 
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bankruptcy courts to sell some or all of their assets quickly114 and they have 
often succeeded in convincing courts to approve a Quick Sale by likening their 
assets to a “melting ice cube” and claiming there was “no time to spare” in 
approving a sale of the estate’s assets.115 
However, even if there is “no time to spare,” it is always the case that courts 
must afford parties-in-interest the procedural protections necessary to 
safeguard their legitimate rights.116  At a minimum, due process requires 
affording parties-in-interest notice of the proposed sale and the opportunity to 
be heard.117  Further protection may also be warranted, such as closely 
scrutinizing the proffered “business judgment” of the debtor-in-possession or 
loosening restrictions found in bid-procedure orders to encourage more robust 
bidding.118  However, affording parties-in-interest the appropriate degree of 
procedural protection should not usually require debtors to initiate an 
adversary proceeding in order to complete a Quick Sale. 
A.  Objections Other than Those Requesting an Adversary Proceeding 
Generally, objections that can be resolved within the contested-matter 
procedural framework are less troublesome because they are less likely to 
cause significant delay.119  Thus, they are usually not objections made for 
strategic purposes.  For example, parties-in-interest might object to a sale 
because they believe that the procedures for bidding on the estate’s assets are 
																																																																																																																																
REV. 1187 (comparing the bankruptcy proceedings of Lehman Brothers with Chrysler and 
General Motors). 
 114. See Skeel, supra note 113, at 1189, 1199 (citing Chrysler’s bankruptcy proceeding as an 
example of the urgency asserted by companies in court). 
 115. See, e.g., Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler, LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 
F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Chrysler fit the paradigm of the melting ice cube.”), vacated as 
moot, 592 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC, No. 09-11078, 2009 WL 
2820610, at *1–2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009); see also Skeel, supra note 113, at 1199 
(discussing the “melting ice cube” theory and the “no time to spare” narrative). 
 116. When an objecting party claims that the potential sale price for the debtor’s assets is 
likely to be too low because of insider dealing or a lack of good faith, courts have generally 
scrutinized such transactions more closely and required a heightened level of disclosure.  See, 
e.g., Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 291 B.R. 39, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003); see also Rose, supra note 11, at 261. 
 117. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(A) (2006) (requiring “such notice as is appropriate in the particular 
circumstances”).  In some cases, “appropriate notice would be the functional equivalent of 
information that would be included in a disclosure statement.”  Rose, supra note 11, at 261 (citing 
In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988)).  Heightened notice may 
be appropriate particularly when, as in In re Naron & Wagner, the debtor seeks to sell 
substantially all of its assets in a private sale to insiders, and where the proposed purchase price is 
sufficient only to pay off an asserted claim and nothing would pass through to other creditors.  Id. 
at 88. 
 118. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 291 B.R. at 43 (remanding the case to bankruptcy court for 
failing to scrutinize the debtor’s business judgment). 
 119. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 21, at 92–93. 
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too restrictive and will inhibit bidding, resulting in a below-market price.120  
They might also object because the proposed purchase price for the assets or 
the price they are expected to fetch at auction is too low.121  It is also common 
for parties-in-interest to object to a Quick Sale claiming that a secured creditor 
is attempting to force through a sale too quickly and that a more fulsome (and 
longer) process would serve to maximize value for the estate.122  Unsecured or 
subordinated creditors commonly assert that the secured creditors are 
pressuring the debtor to accept the first offer that exceeds the amount the 
secured creditors are owed, even though that offer is below the assets’ “true 
value,” thereby limiting the recovery of subordinate creditors.123 
Standard bid and sale procedure orders already provide creditors substantial 
protection and are approved almost universally in Quick Sale cases.124  Typical 
orders require the identification of an initial “stalking horse” bidder and 
provide for the solicitation of competing bids and a public auction.125  To 
encourage the initial bidder to invest sufficient energy and resources to make 
the highest possible bid for the debtor’s assets, bid-procedure orders usually 
allow the debtor-in-possession to pay the reasonable expenses of the stalking 
horse in formulating its initial bid.126  As an added incentive, bid-procedure 
orders commonly provide for the payment of a break-up fee of between one 
																																																								
 120. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 37–39. 
 121. Id. (concluding that bankruptcy sales typically realize a fraction of the going-concern 
value of a company and that reorganization of such companies would typically result in greater 
rates of recovery for creditors).  When issues of insider dealings or lack of good faith are raised, 
courts normally scrutinize the proffered business judgment of the debtor-in-possession more 
closely.  See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 291 B.R. at 43; see also Rose, supra note 11, at 261. 
 122. In In re Lionel Corp., the court made it clear that the appeasement of a major creditor 
was not a sufficient business justification to sell assets pursuant to § 363(b).  Comm. of Equity 
Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1070–72 (2d Cir. 1983); see 
also In re Fremont Battery Co., 73 B.R. 277, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (finding no justifiable 
business reason for authorizing a debtor’s proposed sale because, among other reasons, it would 
benefit only one creditor).  Some academics have suggested that the bankruptcy courts have 
corrupted themselves in an attempt to compete for large bankruptcy cases, and, as a result, Quick 
Sales providing unjustifiably small recoveries are regularly, but inappropriately, approved.  See 
LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 39–41. 
 123. In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 333–34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); Baird, 
supra note 1, at 19 (“Because they do not gain from postponing a sale and face all the downside if 
things go worse than expected, the secured creditors have an incentive to force through a speedy 
sale.”). 
 124. One of the most common ways to resolve these types of objections is to weaken the 
protections offered in those orders to the initial bidder, usually referred to as the “stalking horse” 
bidder.  See Robert G. Sable et al., When the 363 Sale Is the Best Route, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
2 Art. 2, 4–5 (2006) (describing tools that debtors use to encourage initial bidders, or “stalking 
horses,” such as covering costs of due diligence and document preparation). 
 125. Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 1, at 597 (suggesting that the bidding procedures 
establish a structure for soliciting bids and an auction if competing bids are received). 
 126. See Sable et al., supra note 124, at 4–5. 
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and three percent of the purchase price in the event that an alternative bidder 
wins at auction.127  Other common provisions include overbid requirements, 
minimum bid increments, and a requirement that all bids conform to the initial 
bid.128  In addition to protecting the stalking horse, however, these provisions 
can potentially chill bidding because they require any alternative bidders to top 
the stalking horse’s bid by at least those amounts.129  Therefore, a common 
solution to sale objections of the sort mentioned above is to weaken the 
protections offered to the stalking horse bidder.130  Nevertheless, where the 
estate’s assets have been marketed sufficiently, appropriate bid protections can 
provide assurance to the bankruptcy judge that enough was done to achieve the 
best price.131  If the assets have not been marketed sufficiently, the court may 
need to delay an auction to generate sufficient interest in the assets and ensure 
that the debtor obtains the best available price for its assets.132 
By eliminating overbid requirements and other assorted bid protections, a 
bid-procedure order can be sufficiently modified to encourage more active 
bidding for the estate’s assets.133  In addition, such orders often provide 
creditors with the ability to credit bid134 or to submit competing bids.135  When 
coupled with an aggressive and extensive pre-sale marketing campaign, such 
efforts are generally found sufficient to establish that the debtor has obtained 
the best available price for its assets.136  Such efforts may also be sufficient to 
																																																								
 127. See Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 1, at 601 n.47 (citing Pam Huff, Court-Supervised 
Mergers and Acquisitions Opportunities for Knowledgeable Buyers in Distressed Markets, 
BLAKES (Oct. 16, 2007), available at http://www.blakes.com/English/view_disc.asp?ID=1813); 
see also Sable et al., supra note 124, at 4–5. 
 128. Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 1, at 601. 
 129. Michael S. Haber, Asset Dispositions in a Bankruptcy Case: Guidelines for the 
Successful Stalking Horse, TRUST THE LEADERS (2004), http://www.sgrlaw.com/895. 
 130. See Sable et al., supra note 124, at 4–5. 
 131. See In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 324 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding 
that a “heavily marketed” sale with informed buyers ensured fair value). 
 132. See Baird, supra note 1, at 25 (“[I]f the secured creditor has done too little [to market 
the assets] before bankruptcy, allowing it to jam through a sale is inherently problematic.”). 
 133. See id. at 10–11 (criticizing the procedures adopted in the Chrysler bankruptcy cases for 
not doing enough to affirmatively welcome non-conforming bids that contemplated liquidating 
the company). 
 134. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2006). 
 135. Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 1, at 597. 
 136. See, e.g., In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. at 324 (finding that a “heavily 
marketed” sale with informed buyers ensured fair value); D’Antonio v. Bella Vista Assocs., LLC 
(In re Bella Vista Assocs., LLC), No. 07-18134, 2007 WL 4555891, at *14 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 
18, 2007) (finding a widely publicized auction is sufficient to establish that fair value has been 
paid); Coastal Indus., Inc. v. IRS (In re Coastal Indus., Inc.), 63 B.R. 361, 369 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1986); see also Baird, supra note 1, at 25 (concluding that, when a firm has been shopped and all 
options explored, extensive bankruptcy procedures posed by secured creditors are unnecessary). 
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demonstrate that objecting parties are not irreparably harmed by the sale.137  
Therefore, instead of delaying the sale, the most common type of Quick Sale 
objections can be resolved appropriately by modifying the bid-procedure order 
to encourage more active bidding, which helps to ensure that the assets are sold 
for their market value.138 
A common variation on the objection that secured creditors are attempting to 
rush through a sale at below-market prices is a parties-in-interest’s claim that 
the value of the estate would be maximized by selling the property at a later 
date, when, for example, the market for the asset to be sold has improved.139 
Objectors often suggest that the debtor is being shortsighted by not waiting for 
that improvement to occur.140 
These objections are often grounded in the perception that the secured 
creditors have too much influence over the debtor.141  Indeed, secured creditors 
often do hold significant sway over a debtor, particularly if they have provided 
the debtor-in-possession financing on which the debtor is relying or if they 
have liens on the debtor’s cash collateral.142  And it may be true that a Quick 
Sale will be detrimental to the junior parties, but it is unclear that better options 
are available.143 
As noted above, when cash begins to run short, the most important issue is 
whether the debtor can afford to delay and who should fund any ongoing losses 
during that delay.144  As a practical matter, a business that hopes to take 
advantage of its going-concern value needs to remain a going concern.  The 
business needs to fund the expenses forcontinuing its operations, and will 
normally need to use its cash collateral to do so.  A debtor’s cash reserves are 
																																																								
 137. See Baird, supra note 1, at 27–28. 
 138. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 
434, 457 (1999)  (“[T]he best way to determine value is exposure to a market.”); see also Baird, 
supra note 1, at 10–12. 
 139. See, e.g., In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 316 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(asserting that the debtors were “selling their assets at an inopportune time” because they were 
motivated by the “improper purpose of securing tax benefits for a non-Debtor parent entity”). 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 328 n.24 (providing reasons why the sale should be delayed). 
 141. See Baird, supra note 1, at 25 (describing the control the secured creditor has in such 
situations). 
 142. Id. at 18–19.  The days in which the “old managers of a financially distressed business 
called the shots” is long past.  Id. at 18.  These days, “secured creditors begin to control the 
governance of the business” well in advance of any bankruptcy filing.  Id. at 18–19 (citing “a 
growing body of empirical work on this issue”). 
 143. Id. at 19.  The costs of a sale at fire-prices are borne by the junior investors; however, 
because secured creditors bear the risk of asset depreciation caused by delay, it is not clear that a 
court should prefer the junior creditors’ interests over those of senior creditors.  See Baird, supra 
note 1, at 19. 
 144. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 8; see also In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 490 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that one factor in whether to approve a Quick Sale is whether 
there is material risk that by deferring the sale, “the patient will die on the operating table”). 
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normally subject to its senior lenders’ security interests, and the Bankruptcy 
Code severely limits a judge’s ability to authorize the use of encumbered cash 
without the secured creditors’ consent.145  Sophisticated secured creditors often 
refuse to consent unless the bankruptcy judge approves a proposed Quick Sale 
on the secured creditors’ terms.146  It may simply be impossible to devise 
procedures that adequately protect the secured creditors’ priority position and 
their right to control the use of their collateral, while also protecting the junior 
creditors’ position by ensuring that estate assets are sold for the highest 
theoretically available price.147 
B.  Objections That the Property To Be Sold Is Not “Property of the Estate”	
The most potent objection to a sale is that the property to be sold is not 
“property of the estate.”  In other words, the objecting party may claim that the 
property is not the debtor’s to sell.  These objections are potentially potent 
because objectors usually urge the court to require the debtor-in-possession to 
commence a pre-sale adversary proceeding to determine the extent of the 
estate’s interest, if any, in the property to be sold.148  Objections of this sort 
seek to convince the court to move the Quick Sale from the expedient 
procedures that accompany contested matters to stop allowing the debtor to use 
the expedient procedures that accompany contested matters and instead use the 
more cumbersome adversary proceeding track.149  These objections threaten to 
delay the sale while ownership issues are litigated in an adversary proceeding, 
which can potentially impose tremendous costs on other creditors of the 
estate.150 
																																																								
 145. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1) (2006). 
 146. See Baird, supra note 1, at 19–20 (asserting that judges prefer this rather than having the 
case “explode into thousands of contentious lawsuits over the wreckage that follows in the wake 
of a piecemeal liquidation”). 
 147. See Id. at 20 (discussing the importance of protecting the junior investors while ensuring 
that the senior creditors are paid in full); see also In re Gen. Motors, 407 B.R. at 490 (noting that 
a Quick Sale may be appropriate where: (1) the estate lacks the liquidity to survive until plan 
confirmation; (2) the sale opportunity may not still exist at the time of plan confirmation and a 
satisfactory alternative sale opportunity or stand-alone plan alternative that is equally desirable 
may be unavailable; and (3) there is “a material risk that by deferring the sale, the patient will die 
on the operating table”). 
 148. See, e.g., In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., No. 08-11261, 2008 WL 2951974, at 
*4 (Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 28, 2008); see also In re Interiors of Yesterday, LLC, No.  
02-30563LMW, 2007 WL 419646, at *6 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2007). 
 149. See, e.g., In re Interiors of Yesterday, 2007 WL 419646, at *6; In re NJ Affordable 
Homes Corp., No. 05-60442, 2006 WL 2128624, at *11 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 29, 2006); In re 
Beard, 112 B.R. 951, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990). 
 150. In re Whitehall Jewelers, 2008 WL 2951974, at *7 (noting that the debtors would need 
to commence more than 120 adversary proceedings in order to resolve ownership claims 
involving the disputed property). 
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If an estate’s assets are deteriorating rapidly in value, the mere threat of 
delay can be powerful because even a minor delay can jeopardize a tremendous 
amount of value for the estate’s other creditors.151  For example, if the debtor 
has obtained only enough debtor-in-possession financing to conclude a 
relatively expedient sale process, a short delay could jeopardize the debtor’s 
ability to reorganize.152  A debtor-in-possession lender demanding the debtor 
conclude an asset sale on an aggressive timeline is unlikely to fund ongoing 
(and often money-losing) operations while the debtor resolves the ownership 
claims of third-parties in an adversary proceeding.153  And even if a  
debtor-in-possession was willing to extend additional funds, the lender is 
normally entitled to repayment of those sums ahead of other creditors of the 
estate.154  Given the foregoing, it is a significant cause for concern that the 
bankruptcy courts sometimes allow creditors to delay the Quick Sale 
process.155 
In some cases—even after the debtor made a prima facie156 showing that the 
property is property of the estate—courts have refused to approve the Quick 
Sale.157  In other cases, despite the existence of a bona fide dispute within the 
meaning of § 363(f)(4), some courts have delayed a Quick Sale and forced the 
debtor-in-possession to initiate multiple adversary proceedings to resolve the 
disputed ownership claims before the sale.158  Yet, on similar facts, courts have 
																																																								
 151. See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 58 (2008) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. (noting that an immediate sale opens up funds for reorganization); see also AUSTIN 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (noting that some businesses may shut-down if they are delayed in 
selling assets). 
 153. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.  In the recent economic downturn in the United 
States, debtor-in-possession financing became noticeably more difficult to obtain, and, even 
where it was available, the lender often used “the provision of DIP financing to influence the 
timeline and outcome of the [C]hapter 11 case.”  Id. at 2. 
 154. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c), (d) (2006). 
 155. See, e.g., In re Whitehall Jewelers, 2008 WL 2951974, at *7; see also Darby v. 
Zimmerman (In re Popp), 323 B.R. 260, 269 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (concluding the purchaser 
“took the entire risk that the estate did not have good title—or, for that matter, any title” to sell).  
At least one other court has allowed the sale of property via quitclaim deed specifically because 
the debtor was selling only its interest, to the extent it had one, and did not specifically warrant 
that it had any interest to convey.  Gorka v. Joseph (In re Atlantic Gulf Communities, Corp.), 326 
B.R. 294, 301 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).  In addition, the court in In re Balco Equities Ltd. expressed 
no concerns similar to those expressed by the Popp court when it held that the trustee could sell 
real property purportedly owned by the debtor subject to a third party’s alleged lien.  323 B.R. 85, 
92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).  The court required only that the proceeds be held in escrow as 
adequate protection for the objecting party until the court resolved the adversary proceeding 
addressing the third party mortgagee’s claimed interest in the land.  Id. 
 156. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 157. See, e.g., In re Coburn, 250 B.R. 401, 403–04 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). 
 158. See, e.g., In re Popp, 323 B.R. at 270 (holding that a bankruptcy court must determine 
who owns the property before it is sold); In re Whitehall Jewelers, 2008 WL 2951974, at *6–7 
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often approved Quick Sales.159  When courts have approved the sale, it was 
typically based on the recognition that a delayed sale would irreparably harm 
creditors.160 
For instance, in In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., the bankruptcy court 
approved the sale of hundreds of parcels of real property free and clear of all 
liens, claims, and interests despite the objections of several creditors who 
claimed to be the record title owners of certain parcels that were slated to be 
sold.161  The court determined that “the mere fact that title to a property is in 
the name of an investor does not mean that [the debtor] does not have an 
equitable interest in the property.”162  Because the trustee made a prima facie 
showing of ownership, the court refused to halt the sale while ownership rights 
were resolved in an adversary proceeding, despite colorable claims of 
ownership by the objecting parties.163  The court asserted that it was neither 
workable nor necessary to permit discovery and hold hearings with respect to 
the disputed properties in the time available before the sale.164 
When courts refuse to approve a Quick Sale even after a prima facie 
showing that the property to be sold belongs to the estate, which satisfies 
§ 363(f)’s requirement that a bona fide dispute exists, they allow objecting 
parties to unnecessarily and inappropriately derail the Quick Sale process.  
And they do so based on a limited showing that there is some hypothetical 
issue that could harm the objecting party.165  For example, in In re Popp, the 
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the bankruptcy court’s 
																																																																																																																																
(noting that the debtors would need to commence more than 120 adversary proceedings before 
they could sell the disputed property); In re DVI, Inc., 306 B.R. 496, 504 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004). 
 159. See, e.g., In re Downour, No. 06-30854, 2007 WL 963258, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
Mar. 28, 2007) (finding that an expedited sale of assets was appropriate and a bona fide dispute 
existed); In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442, 2006 WL 2128624, at *13 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. June 26, 2006); In re Balco Equities, 323 B.R. at 92; In re Wells, 296 B.R. 728, 734 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003); In re Olympia Holding Corp., 129 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1991). 
 160. See In re NJ Affordable Homes, 2006 WL 2128624, at *13; see also In re Boogaart of 
Fla., Inc., 17 B.R. 480, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (“Where . . . the value of assets is rapidly 
decreasing . . . , liquidation of assets prior to the proposal and confirmation of plans of 
reorganization may be desirable because it will ultimately increase the amounts distributed to 
creditors after [liquidating] plans are confirmed.”); Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 10 (citing In re 
Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988)) (describing a case where the 
court determined that delay of the Quick Sale would cause the company’s daily operations to 
cease and cause damage to the estate’s value). 
 161. 2006 WL 2128624, at *1, *9. 
 162. Id. at *8. 
 163. Id. at *8 n.13. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Darby v. Zimmerman (In re Popp), 323 B.R. 260, 270 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) 
(reversing the bankruptcy court’s Quick Sale approval). 
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decision to approve a Quick Sale of real property through a grant deed,166 
despite the bankruptcy court’s finding that the debtor had at least “some 
interest in the property,” and the purchaser had taken “the entire risk that the 
estate did not have good title—or, for that matter, any title.”167  The 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed because: (1) it would be incongruous to 
grant the sale motion while an adversary proceeding determining the full extent 
of the parties’ ownership rights was already pending; and (2) it avoided 
piecemeal litigation by determining ownership of property before allowing the 
sale.168  The court suggested that it “must seek to promote consistent and 
unfragmented decision-making when faced with the need to determine 
predicate issues such as property ownership in the Section 363 context.”169  
Thus, despite the prior determination that the debtor had at least some interest 
in the property to be sold, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel halted the sale of the 
debtor’s interests until the parties resolved their ownership dispute over the 
property.170 
Like the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Popp, the Third 
Circuit—one of the most influential circuits for bankruptcy cases—has adopted 
a creditor-friendly reading of FRBP 7001(2).171  In In re Mansaray-Ruffin, a 
divided Third Circuit panel appeared to adopt a per se rule that prevents the 
sale of property pursuant to § 363 without a prior determination of whether the 
property to be sold is property of the estate.172  This appears to be a somewhat 
novel reading173 of FRBP Rule 7001(2) and has been scaled back in 
																																																								
 166. Id. at 264, 270 (finding that a grant deed is akin to a quitclaim deed and purports to 
transfer only such interest as the transferor possesses). 
 167. Id. at 270.  But see Gorka v. Joseph (In re Atlantic Gulf Communities, Corp.), 326 B.R. 
294, 301 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (finding that the issuance of a quitclaim deed would not adversely 
affect a party’s right to assert an ownership interest in the disputed property and that the trustee 
had no interest to convey to the purchaser). 
 168. See In re Popp, 323 B.R. at 269–70.  But see White v. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors (In re Cadkey Corp.), 317 B.R. 19, 23–24 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding that the bankruptcy 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a qualified sale of property of the estate and 
determining that the objecting party’s intellectual property rights could be resolved at a 
subsequent hearing). 
 169. In re Popp, 323 B.R. at 270. 
 170. Id. at 265, 270. 
 171. See SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 
233–35, 237–38 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 172. Id. at 235, 237–38, 242 (characterizing the invalidation of a lien on debtor’s property by 
a creditor as being a matter of great consequence). 
 173. See In re Whitehall Jewelers Holdings, Inc., No. 08-11261, 2008 WL 2951974, at *6 
(Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2008) (stating that, before the decision in Mansaray-Ruffin, “courts have 
routinely disregarded [FRBP] Rule 7001(2) in matters similar to the one at issue”); see also In re 
NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442, 2006 WL 2128624, at *10–11 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 
29, 2006); In re Bedford Squares Assocs., L.P., 247 B.R. 140, 145 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2000); In 
re Collins, 180 B.R. 447, 452 n.8 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (citing In re Oneida Lake Dev., Inc. 144 
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subsequent decisions.174  The In re Mansaray-Ruffin decision stands in stark 
contrast to the permissive language used by courts within the Second 
Circuit.175 
The ad hoc, case-by-case approach that courts have taken on this issue 
creates unpredictability and encourages costly and time-consuming litigation.  
The ambiguity caused by this ad hoc approach creates openings for parties to 
raise strategic objections.  Courts need to adopt a systemic approach that 
employs a clear, uniform, and strict standard in order to reduce the number of 
strategic objections. 
C.  Decreasing the Risk of Gamesmanship 
Although some Quick Sale objections are legitimate, parties-in-interest 
sometimes object with the intent of delaying the sale in order to improve their 
bargaining position.176  These strategic attempts to extort a delay-avoidance 
presumably are an important reason why bankruptcy courts should carefully 
scrutinize all Quick Sale objections and, whenever possible, reserve litigation 
until after the sale.  Although judges should employ their sound judicial 
wisdom to ferret out strategic objections, they should not be the sole line of 
defense against such gambits.  Unless courts adopt systemic rules to prevent 
attempts to extract payments outside the normally applicable rules, parties-in-
interest will continue raising the specter of delay in an attempt to extract extra-
legal payments.177 
																																																																																																																																
B.R. 352, 358 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990)) (holding that § 363(f)(4) was satisfied even though an 
adversary proceeding had not yet commenced). 
 174. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378 (2010) 
(finding that, when analyzing a due process claim, the main focus is notice); In re Borkowski, 446 
B.R. 220, 224 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Espinosa and recognizing that “whether the 
procedural rules were precisely followed” is not the proper question when considering a due 
process violation, but whether the party had notice and the opportunity to object); cf. In re 
Wilson, 409 B.R. 72, 77–78 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that an adversary proceeding is not 
required by Rule 7001(2) where collateral valuation occurred through the Chapter 13 
confirmation process); In re Kemp, 391 B.R. 262, 264–65 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2008) (noting that the 
Mansaray-Ruffin decision distinguished between lien invalidation and lien stripping, where the 
latter “does not constitute either a challenge to the validity or the extent of the lien under Rule 
7001(2)”). 
 175. See In re Interiors of Yesterday, L.L.C., No. 02-30563, 2007 WL 419646, at *7 (Bankr. 
D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2007) (noting that, instead of requiring an adversary proceeding, “the Trustee 
might have to commence adversary proceedings . . . because the issue likely may not be amenable 
to resolution in the context of a [§] 363 motion.” (emphasis added)). 
 176. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 
426 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the “alleged ownership claim [was] simply a creditor’s thinly 
veiled attempt to extract partial payment from the debtor” outside of the normally applicable 
rules). 
 177. Id. at 427. 
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The current system implicitly encourages strategic objections.  For example, 
in In re Eclipse Aviation Corp., an ad hoc group of depositors (the Objecting 
Parties) objected to the debtors’ attempt to sell partially completed aircraft 
because they argued the aircraft were not property of the estate and could not 
be sold under § 363(f).178  The Objecting Parties asserted that they were the 
aircraft’s owners.179  However, the aircraft in question were still on the 
assembly line and, in most cases, were not even completely built, let alone 
airworthy.180  The aircraft had very little value unless they could be completed 
and FAA certifications were obtained.181  The only party who appeared able to 
do so was the potential purchaser.182  Selling the aircraft at auction with the 
rest of the debtors’ assets would preserve the debtors’ going-concern value and 
appeared to be the only way to maximize value for all creditors, including the 
Objecting Parties.183  Rather than attempting to maximize the value of the 
estate for the benefit of all creditors, the Objecting Parties appeared to be 
maneuvering to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the debtors by 
contesting the debtors’ right to sell “their” aircraft. 
Ultimately, the court refused to allow the Objecting Parties to derail the 
sale.184  The court required only that replacement liens would attach to the 
proceeds of the sale and the parties could litigate over the proceeds at a later 
date,185 recognizing that a delayed sale was in no one’s interest and that the 
Objecting Parties’ asserted interests could be adequately protected.186  Because 
there has been no systemic approach for resolving Quick Sale objections, the 
																																																								
 178. See Objection of the Production Line Group to Motion of the Debtors for Orders  
¶¶ 20–21, at 7–8, In re Eclipse Aviation Corp., No. 08-13031 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 15, 2009) 
[hereinafter Objection of the Production Line Group].  The Objecting Parties all asserted similar 
claims involving an ownership interest, equitable lien, or special property right and commenced 
(or threatened to commence) adversary proceedings on those grounds against the debtors.  Id. at 
8–10. 
 179. Id. at 8 n.3. 
 180. See id. ¶ 6, at 3 (noting that most of the airplanes were still under construction when the 
debtor entered bankruptcy). 
 181. Id. ¶ 47, at 18. 
 182. Id. ¶¶ 40–43, at 15–17. 
 183. Preserving the going-concern value of a debtor’s assets is one of the primary objectives 
of business bankruptcy. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527–28 (1984); see also 
Kimon Korres, Note, Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 Protections Through 
Manipulation of the Business Justification Standard in § 363 Asset Sales, and a Refined Standard 
to Safeguard Against Abuse, 63 FLA. L. REV 959, 975 (2011) (discussing the “primary objection 
of business organization in bankruptcy”). 
 184. Order (A) Authorizing the Debtors to Sell Substantially All of Their Assets Free and 
Clear of All Liens, Claims and Encumbrances, (B) Authorizing the Assumption and Assignment 
of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, and (C) Granting Related Relief ¶ 2, at 16; 
¶ 54, at 38, In re Eclipse Aviation Corp., No. 08-13031 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 23, 2009). 
 185. Id. ¶ 15, at 23–24. 
 186. Id. ¶ K, at 6–8; ¶FF, at 14–15. 
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parties in this and other cases have been forced to rely solely on bankruptcy 
judges to ensure that debtors can fulfill their fiduciary duty to maximize the 
value of the estate.187 
Bankruptcy courts should view objections that the property to be sold is not 
“property of the estate” skeptically, because such objections are sometimes 
made strategically.  More importantly though, courts should impose a uniform 
standard with a high bar for Quick Sale objections.  Setting a high threshold for 
objections would encourage parties to carefully consider whether they should 
seek such relief in the first instance.188  If parties-in-interest choose not to 
commence such actions, the burdens on the judiciary will be reduced, 
increasing access to justice for parties with colorable arguments.189  Unless 
bankruptcy courts impose a high burden on parties-in-interest who make Quick 
Sale objections, the courts will continue to implicitly encourage specious 
arguments and frivolous, vexatious litigation.  The solution advocated in this 
Article should reduce the risk of gamesmanship by discouraging  
parties-in-interest from bringing frivolous litigation because courts that follow 
the proposed standard will make it clear that specious objections are unlikely 
to succeed. 
The Bankruptcy Code suggests that Quick Sales should occur within the 
expedient contested-matter procedural framework.190  Some courts have balked 
at making the necessary threshold determinations without the additional 
procedural protections that are generally available in an adversary proceeding, 
but this reaction is an error.191  Although the term “property of the estate” 
appears to require some sort of “antecedent determination of property 
																																																								
 187. FRBP 9011(a)(1) is also a possible mechanism for handling strategic objectors, which 
requires objections to “not be[] presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”  FRBP 9011(a)(2) requires that 
all “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law.”  Although FRBP 9011 sanctions may be appropriate in particularly 
egregious cases, they are an ex post solution that relies on deterrence to create ex ante 
compliance.  See generally Penrod W. Keith, Rule 9011 and Its Interpretation in 10th Circuit 
Courts (Am. Bankr. Inst., 2005), available at http://www.abiworld.org/BestofABI 
/2006/materials/kpenrod_CRIMES.pdf (discussing Tenth Circuit case law interpreting various 
sections of Rule 9011).  As discussed below, one advantage of the preliminary injunction 
standard is that it would eliminate strategic objections without causing inappropriate delay in the 
Quick Sale.  Sanctions imposed only after potential bidders have been scared by strategic 
objectors will be cold comfort to parties-in-interest. 
 188. Vaughn, supra note 32, at 844. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004; see also Lawless, supra note 79, at 1272 (“The bankruptcy 
rules require that a debtor move for a ‘free and clear’ sale as a contested matter.”). 
 191. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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interests,”192 such determinations need not fully and finally resolve the issue.  
In such cases, adversary proceedings are not required.  Rather, whether the 
property “is or could become property of the bankruptcy estate” requires only a 
“threshold determination.”193  Given the foregoing, it appears that § 363(f) 
provides the statutory authority justifying the imposition of a preliminary 
injunction standard on challenges to the estate’s authority to seek a Quick Sale. 
IV.  RAISING THE BAR FOR QUICK SALE OBJECTIONS 
Given the competing policy objections implicit in the bankruptcy laws, it is 
unsurprising that judges often emphasize one policy goal over another in their 
decisions.194  However, when Quick Sales are unnecessarily delayed, the delay 
can jeopardize a significant amount of value for creditors.195  Additionally, the 
unpredictability created by the current ad hoc, case-by-case approach creates 
uncertainty, inefficiency, and encourages creditors to engage in 
gamesmanship.196  A systemic approach is needed.  It would increase 
predictability while decreasing the type of costly and time-consuming litigation 
that the current approaches have created.197  Finally, clarity in this area should 
decrease the incidence of gamesmanship by parties-in-interest. 
The appropriate standard should balance the need to provide sufficient 
procedural protection to creditors while allowing Quick Sales to proceed along 
																																																								
 192. Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. (In re Koreag, Controle et 
Revision S.A.), 961 F.2d 341, 348 (2d Cir. 1992).  In re Koreag arose in the context of a turnover 
action in a § 304 cross-border case.  Id. at 344, 348.  Different issues are raised in a turnover 
action than in the Quick Sale context.  See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, 
S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 426 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the “antecedent” determination of 
property ownership was necessary before turning over property to a foreign proceeding for 
ultimate distribution to creditors in that foreign proceeding). 
 193. In re Robotic Vision Systems, Inc., 322 B.R. 502, 508 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005) (citing 
Warnick v. Yassian (In re Rodeo Canon Dev. Corp.), 362 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2004); Moldo v. 
Clark, 266 B.R. 163, 172 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001)). 
 194. Where Congress imposes conflicting mandates, courts often attempt to reach the 
appropriate result on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443, 447 (D. Md. 
1992). 
 195. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 196. Predictable regimes provide “overall clarity and certainty to all parties.”  John J. Chung, 
The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step Toward Erosion of National Sovereignty, 27 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 89, 95 (2006). 
 197. A case-by-case approach prevents the bankruptcy regime from achieving one of its 
central objectives: achieving efficient and expedient judicial resolution of disputes at minimal 
cost.  See Edna Sussman, Examining the Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in the Context 
of Bankruptcy Proceedings, 15 INT’L BAR ASS’N ARBITRATION NEWS 187, 189 (2010); see also 
Vaughn, supra note 32, at 840–41 (arguing that the lack of consistency has created havoc that 
courts fail to confront).  Section 363(m) already provides a significant degree of protection for an 
asset purchaser in a Quick Sale.  11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006) (according a good faith purchaser 
protection regardless of knowledge of an appeal).  Eliminating unnecessary pre-sale litigation, 
however, remains aspirational at this point. 
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the expeditious track that Congress intended for them.198  This Article suggests 
that the appropriate balance in most cases is achievable by requiring objecting 
parties to meet a preliminary injunction standard in order to move Quick Sales 
from the expedient procedural track onto the cumbersome adversary 
proceeding track.199  Imposing the suggested standard would also help to 
effectuate Congress’ intention for § 363(f), which is to promote the 
“alienability of property of the estate right up to the constitutional limit of the 
Fifth Amendment’s ‘takings’ clause, regardless of whoever else may have an 
interest in that property.”200  In addition to representing a “pragmatic and 
realistic” approach to problems inherent in Quick Sales and promoting the free 
alienability of property, imposing the suggested standard ought to provide 
sufficient procedural protection for parties-in-interest.201 
Although there are a “dizzying diversity of formulations” of the preliminary 
injunction requirements,202 courts have traditionally required a party seeking a 
preliminary injunction to demonstrate: (1) a probability of success on the 
merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) that the balance of harms favors the party 
seeking the injunction; and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest, 
where applicable.203  Various courts have stated the test differently and some 
combine the second and third inquiries.204  In every case, the burden of 
establishing an entitlement to the preliminary injunction rests with the party 
seeking that injunction.205  In part, the traditional test was said to have been 
																																																								
 198. See Eisler, supra note 101, at 359 (arguing that Rules 6004(c) and 9014 clarify 
“whatever confusion existed under former Rule 701, which categorized a sale of property free and 
clear as an adversary proceeding, and successor Rule 7001, which did not specify such a sale as 
an adversary proceeding.”); see also Phelan & Ernst, supra note 101, at 260; Vaughn, supra note 
32, at 844. 
 199. Although the standard set forth in this article may strike some as being more similar to a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) than a preliminary injunction, TROs are normally determined 
at an ex parte hearing.  When the non-moving party has notice of the application for a TRO, the 
“procedure that is followed does not differ functionally from that on an application for a 
preliminary injunction and the proceeding is not subject to any special requirements.” 11A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2951 (2d ed. 1995). 
 200. Kuney, supra note 28, at 271. 
 201. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 21, at 90; see also supra note 103 and 
accompanying text. 
 202. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(discussing factors to consider for issuing a preliminary injunction); see also Leubsdorf, supra 
note 32, at 525–26 (detailing the inconsistent combinations of factors considered by courts); 
Vaughn, supra note 32, at 846 (criticizing the array of different standards). 
 203. Vaughn, supra note 32, at 839. 
 204. Id. at 839 n.2. 
 205. Id. 
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formulated in an attempt to preserve the status quo until a full and final 
determination of the merits of the underlying case could occur.206 
A.  Why a Preliminary Injunction Standard? 
A preliminary injunction standard is appropriate for Quick Sale objections 
that claim the property to be sold is not property of the estate because of the 
similarities between the two contexts in which courts make these decisions.  In 
both sale objections and preliminary injunction hearings, the initial hearing 
will occur based on a limited evidentiary record.  In the Quick Sale context, a 
bankruptcy court need only determine that the property to be sold is or could 
become property of the estate.207  This is a “threshold inquiry,” similar to the 
types of matters heard on a traditional motion for a preliminary injunction, 
whereby a party seeks an initial determination as to their likelihood of success 
on the merits, the amount of irreparable harm they might suffer, the effect on 
the public interest, and the balance of harms between the parties.208 
Imposing a preliminary injunction standard will make it more difficult for 
objecting parties to delay Quick Sales and will therefore “promote the 
alienability of property,” which promotes the policy objectives underlying 
§ 363.209  As suggested above, the expeditious resolution of disputes is an 
important function of the bankruptcy laws.210  The bankruptcy laws are also 
concerned with ensuring that parties receive sufficient procedural 
protections.211  In general, appropriate procedural protections include notice 
and the opportunity for a hearing before depriving a party of his or her use of 
the property.212  Courts also recognize that, under appropriate circumstances, 
an after-the-fact hearing can be wholly sufficient to provide due process 
protections.213  The Quick Sale context is one of those circumstances in which 
																																																								
 206. See Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 546 (criticizing the notion that preserving the status 
quo is achievable and suggesting that deciding what constitutes the status quo is, itself, a  
value-laden judgment). 
 207. See Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 B.R. 163, 172 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001). 
 208. Id.  The suggested standard is stricter than the standard formulation of the preliminary 
injunction standard in that, under the current proposal, a prima facie showing that the property to 
be sold is “property of the estate” must be made, whereas a party seeking a preliminary injunction 
may only need to raise a serious question on the merits.  See Vaughn, supra note 32, at 845 
(outlining the lack of consistency in determining a standard and the avoidance of courts in doing 
so). 
 209. Kuney, supra note 28, at 271. 
 210. Id. at 248 (finding that § 363 returns the property to be sold to economic productivity as 
well). 
 211. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 21, at 93 (stating that notice is the most common). 
 212. See, e.g., Mullane Special Guardian v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
313 (1950) (discussing due process standards). 
 213. See In re Petition of KPMG, Inc., 284 B.R. 765, 769 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“Expeditiousness for the benefit of the estate in such instances sometimes requires a ‘contested 
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reserving a full and final decision for an after-the-fact hearing is appropriate, at 
least when a significant delay may threaten to destroy substantial value for the 
estate and its creditors and the objecting party receives adequate protection.214  
Due process requires nothing more.215 
Objections to Quick Sales often threaten to cause substantial harm to the 
debtor and to third-party creditors.  In contrast, objecting parties rarely appear 
likely to suffer substantial, let alone irreparable, harm if a court allows a 
debtor-in-possession to sell assets pursuant to § 363(f) and the court later 
determines that the property that was sold was not property of the estate.216  
Courts generally require that “a plaintiff demonstrates a significant risk that he 
or she will experience harm that cannot adequately be remedied by monetary 
damages” in order to find the creditor would be irreparably harmed.217  One 
reason irreparable harm is particularly difficult to demonstrate in bankruptcy 
cases is because the Bankruptcy Code requires that parties whose property is to 
be used or sold are provided with “adequate protection.”218  Because “the right 
to ‘adequate protection’ is the right to the preservation of the value of a lien 
throughout the bankruptcy proceedings,” adequately protected parties are 
unlikely to be able to demonstrate irreparable harm.219 
The Bankruptcy Code does not limit the parties’ imagination in determining 
how to adequately protect creditors’ interests, but one of the most common 
methods is to grant the party with an interest in the property to be sold a 
																																																																																																																																
matter’ approach to the threshold question of whether the asserted adverse interest rises to the 
level entitled to Rule 7001, ‘Adversary Proceeding’ protections to accord Due Process.”); see also 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 199, § 2951; Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 21, at 90 (discussing 
statements in the Congressional Record that also recognized a full hearing may not always be 
available in the bankruptcy context until after the fact); supra notes 21, 103 and accompanying 
text. 
 214. See Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 B.R. 163, 171–72 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001). 
 215. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 21, at 93 (describing emergency situations in which the 
bankruptcy matter could be resolved on short notice, but that an after-the-fact hearing could 
comport with traditional due process in such circumstances). 
 216. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 541 (“If the final judgment can remedy the plaintiff’s 
injuries, there is no occasion to grant immediate protection which may turn out to have been 
based on error.”). 
 217. D’Antonio v. Bella Vista Assocs., LLC (In re Bella Vista Assocs., LLC), No. 07-18134, 
2007 WL 4555891, at *10 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2007) (citing Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 
204 F.3d 475, 484–85 (3d Cir. 2000)).  See contra In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No.  
05-60442, 2006 WL 2128624, at *14 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 26, 2006) (stating that “the 
professionally crafted marketing and sale procedures . . . will provide adequate protection” 
despite the loss of non-economic rights because the sale proceeds will be escrowed and will 
remain subject to the objecting parties’ interests). 
 218. See supra note 103. 
 219. See Collen, supra note 25, at 564. 
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“replacement lien” on sale proceeds.220  In many cases, such as a claimed 
interest in a fungible commodity, an aggressively marketed public auction 
coupled with a lien on the proceeds of the sale generally ensures that the party 
with an interest in the property to be sold receives the benefit of its bargain.221  
Even in the case of real property, monetary relief may be sufficient to provide 
adequate compensation.222  Thus, even the existence of a dispute over “unique” 
property will not always indicate that a Quick Sale should be delayed.223  This 
is especially true if an objecting party can be granted some modified right to 
credit bid their claim at auction, or if the court can grant the objecting party a 
right of first refusal.224  Courts may appropriately address these rights in a 
carefully worded adequate protection order. 
																																																								
 220. See e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. v. 
LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 973 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1992).  The Leubsdorf-Posner 
formulation has been criticized on the basis that it limits judicial discretion in crafting an 
appropriate preliminary injunction order. See Vaughn, supra note 32, at 850 (suggesting that 
courts focus too much on success on the merits during a preliminary injunction hearing tend to 
ignore the interlocutor role they play and tend to have a mini-trial when it is not appropriate).  
However warranted such criticism may be in the preliminary injunction context, it is not 
warranted in the Quick Sale context, where the flexibility advocated is available in crafting an 
appropriate adequate protection order.  See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re 
Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[A] bankruptcy judge must have substantial 
freedom to tailor his orders to meet differing circumstances.”). 
 221. See In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 324 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding 
that a “heavily marketed” sale in which “potential buyers were presented with abundant 
information” ensured that “the sale process reflects a true test of value”). 
 222. See In re Bella Vista Assocs., 2007 WL 4555891, at *10 (suggesting that the general 
rule regarding the insufficiency of monetary compensation is not a per se rule, but merely a 
presumption of irreparable harm); In re NJ Affordable Homes, 2006 WL 2128624, at *9; In re 
Balco Equities Ltd., 323 B.R. 85, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (allowing the trustee to sell real 
property purportedly owned by the debtor, but subject to a third party’s alleged lien so long as the 
proceeds were held in escrow until the adversary proceeding resolved the property interest).  But 
see In re Clark, 266 B.R. at 171–72 (holding that a debtor’s right to own the disputed real 
property “would not have been preserved had they been sold, with his interest in them transferred 
to proceeds”). 
 223. Nevertheless, disputes over unique property, such as intellectual property rights, may 
counsel in favor of greater procedural protection or the ex ante resolution of disputes.  See In re 
Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202(ALG), 2012 WL 2255719, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 15, 
2012) (holding that disputed Kodak patents required an adversarial proceeding).  But see White v. 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Cadkey Corp.), 317 B.R. 19, 23–24 (D. Mass. 
2004) (allowing the sale in spite of a dispute over intellectual property). 
 224. In re Clark, 266 B.R. at 171–72.  Such protections will be further addressed in a 
proposed follow-up to this article.  Cf. Kling, supra note 29, at 275 (noting that the problematic 
implications of credit bidding and the limitations on free and clear sales suggest the need for 
certain portions of § 363 to be “rethought”). 
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B.  The Leubsdorf-Posner Preliminary Injunction Standard Is Appropriate for 
Quick Sales 
Professor John Leubsdorf offered one of the most cogent criticisms of the 
traditional standard in his seminal article, The Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctions.225  Leubsdorf suggests that the traditional standard for obtaining a 
preliminary injunction is wrong-headed in its focus on attempting to preserve 
the status quo.226  Not only is it is often impossible to maintain the status quo, 
but determining what constitutes the status quo often involves drawing 
conclusions as to which party is correct.227  In place of the traditional approach, 
Professor Leubsdorf suggests a revised formulation, which was subsequently 
championed by Judge Posner and adopted by the Seventh Circuit.228 
The Leubsdorf-Posner formulation of the preliminary injunction standard 
requires a court to make two inquiries: (1) the likelihood that each side will 
succeed on the merits at a full hearing; and (2) the amount of irreparable harm 
that each side will likely suffer in the event the court acts on a view of the 
merits that later proves to be incorrect.229  The court should then multiply the 
expected loss by the likelihood of success on the merits.230  The  
Leubsdorf-Posner formulation requires that courts should adopt whichever 
course of action suggests the smaller probable loss.231  Thus, a party, moving 
or non-moving, that faces a large potential loss can prevail even if its chances 
of succeeding on the merits are not as strong as the other party’s chances.  By 
weighing the expected costs and the likelihood of success on the merits, the 
Leubsdorf-Posner formulation is designed “to minimize the expected 
																																																								
 225. See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 32. 
 226. Id. at 535. 
 227. Id. at 546 (suggesting that courts interfere in cases just as much when preserving the 
status quo as when they are not). 
 228. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(applying the new standard). 
 229. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 541 (arguing that the model incorporates the most 
prominent features of the standard preliminary injunction formulation).  But see Robert R.W. 
Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary 
Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 407 (2005) (criticizing the Leubsdorf-Posner rule as 
unfeasible because of the impossibility of quantifying the variables the rule implicates and 
because the rule unduly limits judicial discretion). 
 230. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 541.  The Leubsdorf-Posner standard can be contrasted 
with tests used in different jurisdictions.  Despite significant variety among jurisdictions, most 
courts rely on some variation of the following four part standard: “(1) plaintiff’s likelihood of 
success on the merits, (2) the amount of irreparable harm likely in the absence of the injunction, 
(3) a balancing of expected harms to plaintiff and those to defendant, and (4) the public interest.”  
Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 229, at 389–90. 
 231. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, 541–42. 
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‘irreparable’ loss to both parties resulting from an erroneous grant or denial of 
the preliminary injunction.”232 
This Article suggests that courts should adopt the Leubsdorf-Posner 
formulation of the preliminary injunction standard when considering Quick 
Sale objections.233  This particular formulation is the most appropriate because 
it focuses on minimizing irreparable harms caused by incorrect decisions.234  
Error minimization is an important consideration in dealing with contested 
Quick Sales where parties may be irreparably harmed if a sale does not occur 
in a timely fashion.235 
At an initial hearing on a Quick Sale objection, each side may argue that it 
will suffer irreparable harm if the relief sought is (or is not) granted.  A  
debtor-in-possession may argue that time is of the essence because, for 
instance, the value of the assets to be sold is deteriorating rapidly,236 the 
proposed purchaser is unwilling to delay the sale,237 because the debtor-in-
possession financing the company is running out of money and no further 
																																																								
 232. Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 229, at 392; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at  
540–41 (“[T]he preliminary injunction standard should aim to minimize the probable irreparable 
loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty decision.”). 
 233. See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(discussing the Leubsdorf-Posner standard as a balance of harms to the plaintiff and defendant).  
See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 32 (discussing the preliminary injunction standard).  But see 
Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 229, at 390 (arguing that, in deciding whether a preliminary 
injunction should be granted, courts should consider whether so doing would induce “socially 
beneficial behavior during the pendency of litigation”).  See generally John Leubsdorf, 
Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2007) (responding to 
the Brooks and  Schwartz critique in detail). 
 234. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, 540–41; see also Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 229, at 392 
(critiquing the Leubsdorf-Posner rule for not paying sufficient attention to whether preliminary 
injunctions promote or discourage desirable behavior). 
 235. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, 540–41. 
 236. See In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC, No. 09-11078, 2009 WL 2820610, at *1–2 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009) (discussing the assets’ ever-decreasing value as an overriding factor in 
considering sale); see also In re Boogaart of Fla., Inc., 17 B.R. 480, 483–84 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1981) (“Where . . . the value of assets is rapidly decreasing . . . liquidation of assets prior to the 
proposal and confirmation of plans of reorganization may be desirable because it will ultimately 
increase the amounts distributed to creditors after [liquidating] plans are confirmed.”); Skeel, 
supra note 113, at 1189 (discussing the “no time to spare” narrative). 
 237. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 96–97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 
F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009); vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Thomson 
McKinnon Sec., Inc., 120 B.R. 301, 308–09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (determining that, with “no 
other prospective purchaser in sight,” it was appropriate to approve the sale on the terms 
presented rather than “comprise the debtor’s only remaining substantial asset”); cf. In re Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. No. 01-00056, 2001 WL 1820326, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001) 
(noting that “TWA had no other strategic transaction available to it and no other offer for value to 
which it could turn”). 
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financing is available,238 or there is insufficient time to allow for conversion to 
and liquidation under Chapter 7.239 
By contrast, the objecting party is likely to make a more straightforward 
irreparable harm claim.240  The objecting party is likely to argue that, because 
the property to be sold is not property of the estate, it will be deprived of due 
process if the debtor sells the property before the court makes a full and final 
determination regarding ownership.241  In addition, the objecting party may 
also argue that the property to be sold is unique in some way and therefore 
monetary compensation is inadequate.242 
Such arguments should be examined closely and, in appropriate cases, may 
be sufficient to establish irreparable harm.  For example, creditors who object 
to the sale of intellectual property may be able to demonstrate that they cannot 
be adequately protected by a lien on the proceeds of a sale.243  Additionally, in 
cases where irreparable harm to both sides is possible, the decision to allow or 
not to allow the Quick Sale may necessarily lead to some loss.244  One 
advantage of adapting the Leubsdorf-Posner formulation to Quick Sales, 
however, is that its goal is to “chart the course likely to inflict the smallest 
probable irreparable loss of rights.”245 
Although a court should hesitate to deny an objecting party the right to an ex 
ante determination of its property rights, a court should also be equally hesitant 
to delay a Quick Sale and potentially inflict serious harm on third-party 
creditors when an objecting party cannot meet the Leubsdorf-Posner 
standard.246  Imposing a clear, uniform, and strict standard on objecting parties 
would provide a benefit for all parties.  It would increase the predictability and 
																																																								
 238. See In re Brookfield Clothes, Inc., 31 B.R. 978, 986 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding 
that the asserted exigency was a “deadline imposed by the purchaser for the acceptance of an 
apparently generous offer”). 
 239. See In re Alves Photo Serv., Inc., 6 B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (holding that, 
just because liquidation might be in the best interests of the estate, that alone did not suffice for 
Chapter 7 proceedings); see also Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 7. 
 240. See supra notes 134, 137 and accompanying text. 
 241. This is precisely the argument made by the Objecting Parties in In re Eclipse Aviation 
Corp.  Objection of the Production Line Group, supra note 178. 
 242. See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
 243. Cf. In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202(ALG), 2012 WL 2255719, at *3 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012).  But see White v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Cadkey 
Corp.), 317 B.R. 19, 23–24 (D. Mass. 2004) (allowing the sale to proceed and finding that 
intellectual property rights could be resolved at a later hearing). 
 244. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 541. 
 245. Id.  The Leubsdorf-Posner formulation has been criticized for its focus on risk 
minimization because that focus undermines “the traditional function of interlocutory relief.”  See 
Vaughn, supra note 32, at 850.  Although this may be a viable criticism in the preliminary 
injunction context, risk minimization seems appropriate in Quick Sales where ensuring that the 
standard achieves “the traditional function of interlocutory relief” is not a particular concern. 
 246. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 547. 
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efficiency of Quick Sales by decreasing the likelihood that they will be 
derailed by strategic creditor behavior.247  Further, because the suggested 
standard requires that a debtor-in-possession make a prima facie showing that 
the property to be sold is property of the estate, an objecting party can expect 
to receive as much or more procedural protection than is typically available in 
a preliminary injunction hearing and certainly more than a hearing on a 
TRO.248  Under the proposed standard and within the available constraints 
presented by the particular facts of the case at bar, the courts will be able to 
provide objecting parties with careful consideration of the merits of their case 
at the initial hearing and the benefit of a full and final determination after the 
fact. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Congress drafted § 363 with the intent to promote the “alienability of 
property of the estate right up to the constitutional limit of the Fifth 
Amendment’s ‘takings’ clause, regardless of whoever else may have an 
interest in that property.”249  Requiring objecting parties to meet a standard 
akin to the Leubsdorf-Posner formulation of the preliminary injunction 
standard should ensure that most Quick Sales remain on the expeditious 
“motion” track without unduly limiting objecting parties’ due process rights.  
A number of courts have already recognized this approach as correct and have 
allowed Quick Sales to proceed upon a prima facie showing by a  
debtor-in-possession that the property to be sold is property of the estate and 
that objecting creditors can be adequately protected.  These courts have 
reserved the issue of the objecting party’s interest in the property for a 
subsequent hearing where the court would determine the issue of distributing 
sale proceeds.250  This Article suggests that the explicit adoption of this 
standard will increase predictability in Quick Sales, decrease the likelihood of 
strategic behavior, and lead to a more uniform application of the bankruptcy 
																																																								
 247. See Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 229, at 387 (“[I]n the presence of legal uncertainty, 
a key (but largely unappreciated) function of preliminary injunctions is to promote efficiency.”). 
 248. In some jurisdictions, a party seeking a preliminary injunction is only required to “raise 
a serious question on the merits,” which is a substantially lower threshold than the proposal in this 
Article, which requires a prima facie showing.  Vaughn, supra note 32, at 845–46; see also Sable 
et al., supra note 124, at 3 (noting that bankruptcy courts have wide discretion in requiring a sale 
to be conducted in the manner it deems most appropriate). 
 249. Kuney, supra note 28, at 271. 
 250. See Federico v. McGranahan (In re Federico), No. 08-2182, 2009 WL 2905855, at *3 
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009) (leaving the determination of property interests for another time); see 
also In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442, 2006 WL 2128624, at *15 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
June 26, 2006) (“[E]conomies of scale weigh in favor” of the proposal to sell property free and 
clear of the claims of other potential owners of the property because those objectors’ arguments 
were “not responsive to the economic realities presented.”); In re Balco Equities Ltd., 323 B.R. 
85, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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laws.  A systemic approach to Quick Sale objections is the only appropriate 
remedy for the type of systemic problem identified by this Article. 
It is problematic that some courts have denied debtors-in-possession the 
right to quickly sell estate assets, particularly when the delay has threatened or 
destroyed a debtor’s ability to reorganize or unnecessarily destroyed value in 
the estate.  In addition to preventing the estate from converting distressed 
assets expeditiously into either a fund for distribution to the estate’s creditors 
or to a  debtor’s ongoing operations, the issues of when and in what type of 
proceeding to determine property interest have divided courts.  This division 
creates unpredictability for all parties involved in Quick Sales.  Adopting a 
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